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Abstract 
 
For some time now it has been argued that the traditionally strong ties between social 
democratic parties and trade unions are weakening. There is, however, limited research on 
the unorganized, individual part of the relationship. The aim of this study is to fill some of 
this knowledge gap. The thesis is a comparative case study of the development in personnel 
ties in Norway and Germany from 1957-2017. The parliamentary representatives that hold or 
have held positions in a trade union during four parliamentary periods have been mapped. 
The primary data source is literary biographies. The data utilized is a combination of already 
existing data and completely new data collected specifically for this study. The analysis of 
the data shows that there has been and still are personnel ties between the trade unions and 
social democratic parties in Norway and Germany. These ties have declined since the 1950s, 
but the pace of this decline has been different in the two countries. The ties in Germany have 
declined gradually (strong-medium-weak), while the ties in Norway started off as medium 
strong, following an upsurge to strong ties in 1997, before a drastic decrease in 2013. It is 
also evident that the personnel ties are declining in accordance with other kinds of ties. 
However, there is variation between different ties that call for further investigation.  
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 1 
1 Introduction 
 
A common view in scholarly literature is that the relationship between parties and interest 
groups shapes the nature of democratic governance (Thomas 2001:1). Research on the party-
interest group relationship is thus key to understanding power relations in democratic 
countries. For some time now, scholars have argued that the ties between interest groups and 
parties have become weaker (Padgett and Paterson 1991; Allern and Bale 2012; Kirchheimer 
1966). The traditionally strong ties between social democratic parties and trade unions are 
among the ties that are weakening (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007). However, the 
trend is not uniform, and empirical studies show variation across countries. This variation is 
most evident in more organized forms of contact tying the party and unions together. For 
instance, it is widely known that many social democratic parties and unions meet regularly in 
joint committees such as the German Gewerkschaftsrat or the Norwegian Cooperation 
Committee. These are organized arenas were the politicians and unionists exchange 
information and discuss relevant issues. There are also party-union contact that is not based 
on such organized settings or formal rules. For instance, politicians who have overlapping 
official positions in both trade union and party. These are most likely influential ties, 
however, there is less knowledge about such unorganized ties. These ties are also part of the 
relationship that is key to understanding democratic governance, and as such, it is important 
to untangle these networks of people sitting with two hats at the same time.  
 
First of all, considering that there is little knowledge and data about the unorganized ties, it is 
essential to start the mapping the actual existence of these ties. Second, it is necessary to 
uncover if the weakening found in more organized ties is evident in all kinds of ties, also 
unorganized ties. Third, it is time to explore how these ties are developing compared to other 
more organized ties. The aim of this thesis is to shed light on the relationship between social 
democratic parties and trade unions by examining the unorganized side of the relationship. 
Systematic research and comparison of these ties could help to better understand and explain 
the development of the party-union relationship as a whole. Moreover, comparison of how 
the ties differ in strength and character across countries and over time can possibly provide 
new answers and perspectives. Thus, the general research question in this thesis is: To what 
extent are there personnel ties between the trade unions and social democratic parties in 
Norway and Germany, and how have these ties developed over time? 
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1.2 Background 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, close relationships between parties and interest 
groups became widespread (Duverger 1990). Some of the best examples were found in 
Europe, where the social democratic parties and unions had established strong ties to unions 
(Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007). These relationships surfaced with the expansion of 
democratic rights.  Moreover, the social democratic parties and trade unions were part of the 
labour movement that emerged as a reaction to an elite driven political sphere, where cadre 
parties dominated. Following the expansion of political rights, the public engaged and 
gathered based on common interests and social background. Duverger (1990) argues that this 
led to the development of mass-parties and for the social democratic parties this led to the 
establishment of strong ties to the unions. However, during the second half of the 20th 
century, the ties were claimed to have weakened, due to changes in the economy and 
electorate. Social democratic parties were forced to look for new members and supporters 
through ‘catch all-strategies’ (Kirchheimer 1966; Katz and Mair 1995). Exclusive ties with 
unions became less useful because ‘target voters’ did not necessarily belong to the unions 
anymore. Due to the general decline of common political interests the parties and unions 
adapted by loosening mutual ties. In 1995, Katz and Mair presented a new party hypothesis 
that supports the theory of detachment between parties and interest groups. They claim that 
parties are becoming brokers between civil society and the state, rather than agents of civil 
society (1995:14). Moreover, parties are becoming part of the state apparatus itself, organized 
in cartels. These new parties share a mutual interest for organizational survival, which 
changes the general competition between parties, as well as the relevance and role of interest 
groups.  
 
Several scholars agree about a weakening of ties and observe empirically that there is a trend 
of decline in the ties between most parties and interest groups (Thomas 2001; Allern and Bale 
2012; Allern 2010; Padgett and Paterson 1991). However, the trend is not uniform and it is 
by no means clear how strong the decline actually is. For instance, in the early 1990s Padget 
and Paterson (1991:220–221) stressed that the pace of change in party-union relationships 
seemed to differ across country borders. Sundberg (2001:11) concluded that the ties in the 
Nordic region had deteriorated at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Thomas (2001) 
nuanced this finding by discovering a decline in the party-union ties in democracies that have 
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had strong left-wing governing parties (e.g. Britain and Sweden). Allern and Bale (2012:105–
106) conclude that the overall picture is one of decline, but that there are still unanswered 
questions about how parties and interest groups are linked. Existing research seems to focus 
on the organized ties and whether these ties have become weaker. There is, in contrast, 
limited empirical research about the unorganized ties (Allern 2010:52). The separation 
between the social democratic parties and the unions is not necessarily as evident at the 
individual level. By widening the scope and comparing two countries that have traditionally 
strong, but somewhat different party-union ties, I seek to shed light on the individual level 
and study ties that are less organized.  
 
1.2 Research question, design and data 
 
This thesis is a comparative case study where a part of the unorganized party-union ties 
(personnel ties) is examined and compared over time in Norway and Germany. The unit of 
analysis is limited to the party side and the parliamentary groups from the Norwegian Labour 
Party (Arbeiderpartiet, Ap) and the German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands, SPD). One of the reasons for studying the parliamentary groups is that 
prior research about personnel ties, materialized as the MPs (Members of Parliament) trade 
union background, is limited. An in-depth study of the parliamentary groups is thus 
interesting because these groups are not an organizational entity per se, but elected 
individuals meeting in parliament for four years. It is indisputable that these individuals have 
power and influence, and often other, additional positions in the party organisation. Another 
reason is the lack of available data. It has been difficult to access information about the party 
organisation as a whole, especially in Germany. To get similar data (biographies) from the 
same time periods in Norway and Germany, the parliamentary groups were the most feasible 
entity to study and compare. Thus, I will not be studying the LO-organisation or other kinds 
of ties such as financial support or ideological affinity. Nor will I direct much attention 
towards explaining factors. This is to limit the scope of the thesis and make leeway for 
discussions of the findings at the end. Still, the comparison of two cases will certainly 
illuminate some of the factors shaping the relationship and thus I will discuss this briefly in 
the final chapters.  
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The starting point of this thesis is the ‘common truth’ about the weakening of party-union ties 
in the 1960s. Since there is limited research on the development of the unorganized 
individual side of this relation I am questioning how the personnel ties have developed. The 
overarching research question entails a study of to what extent there are personnel ties 
between the trade unions and social democratic parties in Norway and Germany over time. 
Based on this mapping I seek to examine if a decline is evident over time, if the ties have 
developed differently in the two countries and lastly to compare the personnel ties with other 
kinds of ties. This can be summarized in three integral research questions: 
 
1. Have the personnel ties in Norway and Germany declined since 1957? 
2. Have the personnel ties developed differently in the two countries? 
3. Is the development of the personnel ties coherent with the development of more 
organized ties?  
 
To answer these questions, I will map the parliamentary representatives that hold or have 
held positions in a trade union or a trade union confederation during four parliamentary 
periods. The focus is on the traditional Ap and SPD allies; German Confederation of Trade 
Unions, DGB, and its unions, and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, LO, and its 
unions. I am not aiming to map the profile of the different MPs, but rather count how many 
of the representatives who have a trade union background. The Norwegian data is from NSD 
(Norwegian Social Science data service)1, but coded by me. I have collected the German data 
by systematically reading through CVs and biographies of the parliamentary representatives. 
The main source in both countries is biographies. To make the data as comparable as 
possible, I have coded the data by following the same coding principals in both cases. I will 
use a framework developed by Allern (2010) to evaluate the strength of the ties and compare 
the strength over time and between the two countries. I will also compare the findings in this 
thesis with the development in more organizational ties. The thesis will thus contain three 
comparative stages. The first stage is a comparison of the developments of the personnel ties 
over time within each country. The second stage is a comparison of the development of the 
personnel ties between the two countries. The last stage is part of the discussion chapter and 
will include a comparison of trends in different kinds of ties over time. This will be based on 
                                                        
1 (Some of) the data used in this publication are based on Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) 
Politician Archive 1945 dd. The material is available by Stortinget and facilitated by NSD. Neither Stortinget 
nor NSD are responsible for the analysis of data or interpretations presented here. 
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secondary literature that I will review in chapter three. The last stage is meant to place the 
personnel ties in the broader party-union development and see if and how the findings are 
coherent with the general party-union trends. Moreover, by comparing the different ties in the 
two countries it is possible to attain more insight to the relation between different ties.  
 
The reason for choosing Norway and Germany is first of all that both countries have had 
strong party-union ties that have declined since the 1960s (Allern 2010; Allern, Aylott, and 
Christiansen 2007; Padgett and Paterson 1991; Kirchheimer 1966). Both cases are therefor 
interesting when studying the decline of unorganized ties over time. Secondly, the ties have 
differed in strength and type. In Norway, organized ties such as recommended collective 
affiliation (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007:614) have been more apparent than perhaps 
other kinds of ties. Still, less organized ties such as personnel ties have also existed, but there 
is limited empirical knowledge about the variation and strength of these ties (Allern 
2010:52). In Germany the unorganized ties on the individual level have been perceived as 
dominant, but, as in Norway, there is limited knowledge about strength and variation over 
time (Allern 2010; Allern and Bale 2012; Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009). Overall, 
there is limited empirical information about exactly how the ties have developed and how 
strong they actually are in both countries. This prompts several questions about the pace, 
extent and degree of decline in the unorganized ties, as well as questions about the 
development of these ties compared to other kinds of ties. I will argue that the mapping and 
comparison of unorganized ties in Norway and Germany unravels a party-union landscape 
there is little knowledge about.  
 
1.3 Rationale for conducting this study 
 
The main reason for conducting this study is that there is a lack of information on personnel 
party-union ties. To fully understand the existence, strength and development of the party-
union ties, the individual level must be included. Moreover, research on these ties is 
important because parties and unions have been, and still are, essential parts of the 
democratization process in most European countries. Studying the personnel party-union ties 
might provide new insight about how parties and trade unions involve and represent civil 
society in democratic processes. The potential of this specific thesis is that it will, by 
mapping and comparing personnel ties, extract and systematize essential knowledge about 
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the social democratic parties’ connection to trade unions. This could provide a better 
understanding of the actual existence of party-union elite networks. It may possibly uncover 
whether a trade union background is weighed in as nomination criteria to parliament. Thus, 
the thesis is a contribution to the party literature about party-interest group ties, as well as a 
contribution to the literature about democratic processes such as recruitment to parliament.  
 
1.4 Thesis outline 
 
The thesis is divided into six chapters following this introduction chapter. Chapter 2 provides 
a review of the literature and theory about the development of party-union ties. The overview 
is meant to give an understanding of the relationship, and give basis for some expectations 
that will be derived in the next chapter. The third chapter will comprise overviews of the two 
cases studied, in light of the literature presented in chapter 2. Moreover, I will describe the 
historical development of the party-union relationship in Norway and Germany and review 
the secondary literature documenting existent ties in the two countries. Based on the theories 
from chapter 2 and the historic and empirical review in chapter 3, I will outline some 
expectations. Chapter 4 includes the research design. The method and data will be presented, 
as well as the analytical framework used to assess the strength of the ties. In the fifth chapter 
the data will be presented, analysed and compared. The personnel ties will be analysed within 
each country over time, and the developments will be compared between the two countries. 
The expectations presented in chapter 4 will be discussed in light of the findings. In the sixth 
chapter developments of the personnel ties will be compared with other ties in each country. 
This is to examine if the different ties are developing consistently, and further, to get better 
insight into the relation between different ties. This comparative design also provides leeway 
for some reflections about what factors may explain the extent and the development of this 
relationship. In chapter seven the findings will be summarized and discussed further. This 
final chapter will also include an outlook to future research.  
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2 General literature review 
 
In this section I will present an overview of the main theories and empirical studies about the 
development and trends of the party-union ties. The starting point of this review is the 
introduction of social democracy and Duverger’s mass party model (1990; 1959). With the 
expansion of political rights the new mass party developed during the 20th century. Since the 
1960s, several scholars have challenged Duverger’s mass party hypothesis and developed 
new models describing and explaining change and decline. The first section of this chapter 
will be based on scholarly works within the party-literature, mainly focusing on the 
contributions from Duverger, Kirchheimer (1966) and Katz and Mair (1995). In the second 
section of the chapter I will briefly present different conceptualisations and further review the 
empirical research examining the scholar’s theories. Because it is the social democratic 
party’s parliamentary groups that are studied, this section will also include an overview of the 
recruitment literature of MPs. 
 
Based on the theories and general empirical review in this chapter it is possible to draw some 
expectations about the development of the party-union ties. However, these expectations will 
not be presented until the end of chapter 3 (section 3.4). The reason is that it is essential to 
narrow the scope and expectations to the two cases that will be studied. Thus, the 
expectations will be based on general theories and trends presented in this chapter, and on the 
historic and empirical review of the actual ties in Norway and Germany presented in chapter 
three. Before turning to the broader literature I will distinguish and define the organizations 
and social democratic parties studied in this thesis. 
 
2.1 Parties and interest groups 
 
The development of parties is closely linked to the emergence of parliamentary government 
and universal suffrage (Scarrow 2006:6). The advance of parties are often seen in connection 
with the growing need for organization against strong governments, and the seeking of votes 
in mass electorates (Allern and Bale 2012:8). From the nineteenth century, parties were 
shaped based on their role in democracy; representing civil society, ensuring responsible 
governance and implementing policy change. This made many refer to parties as 
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“gatekeepers” to political power (ibid). Since parties and interest groups are seen as the 
intermediaries in democracies, the differences between them are not always easy to grasp. 
They both aggregate individual interests and preferences into collective demands, they seek 
to influence public policy, and, in one way or the other, they exclude entities such as 
completely unorganized groups (Allern and Bale 2012:9–10). What makes a party unique is 
the combination of interests and that they are oriented toward elections (Pomper 1992:145). 
This can be seen as the feature that separates parties from other groups. When giving a party-
definition Pomper (1992:145) refers to Epstein, who includes this electoral element: “Any 
group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental officeholders under a given 
label”. 
 
In contrast, interest groups are organizations of individuals or sub-groups that are usually also 
formally organized, but only attempts to influence public policy from the outside (Thomas 
2001:7–8). Interest groups cover wide-ranging distinctive group categories and their attempts 
on influencing related public policy are led by people who do not seek office (Allern and 
Bale 2012:10). Nevertheless, it is important to underline that the difference between parties 
and interest groups are somewhat blurry. It is both dependent on what kind of interest group 
it is and what its function is compared to the party. A clear-cut distinction between the two is 
demanding, especially between the social democratic parties and trade unions that 
traditionally have had very close ties. I will make this distinction a bit clearer by taking a 
closer look at the founding and development of social democratic parties. This is necessary to 
study the strength of the relationship and examine why the two have been tied together.  
 
2.1.1 Social democratic parties 
 
Social democratic parties arose as a response to the European industrialisation and the 
increasing numbers of industrial workers. These workers where in a way the ‘denizens’ of 
capitalism and shared a common experience of powerlessness and exploitation (Padgett and 
Paterson 1991:3). As a response to this shared sentiment they gathered in new parties; 
“…social democrats formed mass membership parties, disciplined and hierarchical, almost 
military in organisation” (Padgett and Paterson 1991:3–4). They reflected a new class 
solidarity that made way for the founding of socialist ideas in the political realm. Across 
Europe, many parties where established and inspired by Marxist ideas and the German SPD 
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is often seen as the cradle of ‘Marxian’ social democracy (Padgett and Paterson 1991:4–5). 
These parties were characterised by their appeal to a similar electorate (mostly working 
class), combining internal democracy, leader autonomy and a cohesive mass membership 
(Duverger 1990; Padgett and Paterson 1991). The parties’ biggest strength was their ability to 
mobilize the working class. The development of social democracy was different across 
Europe and mostly dependent on the growth of industrial capitalism and the associated 
working class (ibid). The merge between socialism and labour that took place in most 
northern European countries did not occur in countries such as Italy. The northern European 
parties had a more clear sense of their purpose and became geared to convert their mass-
membership to electoral majorities. The trade unions were an important ally in securing an 
electoral majority, in addition to securing the worker’s rights.  
 
2.1.2 Trade unions 
 
According to Gumbrell-Mccormick and Hyman (2013:2) quoting Webb and Webb, trade 
unions are continuous associations of wage-earners aiming on maintaining or improving the 
conditions of their employment. Trade unions’ function is to comprise mutual insurance, 
meaning providing financial benefits when members face hardship, collective bargaining, and 
legal enactment, referring to pressure for favorable government action (ibid). Moreover, trade 
unions are mainly known as associations of workers from a particular trade, industry, 
company or institution seeking to ensure that earnings and conditions are governed by rules 
applied consistently across their membership base (Allern and Bale 2014:3). Some unions are 
also professional associations and have political and social aims, beyond for example the 
bargaining of wages (ibid). In this thesis the focus is on union confederations that have 
traditionally been allies with the social democratic parties in Norway and Germany: The 
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjonen, LO) and the Confederation 
of German Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB), respectively. In Norway, 
LO is the main confederation gathering 24 different unions (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge 
2015). In Germany, most labour unions are represented by the DGP. During the 1990s it was 
claimed that they represented 85 per cent of the 10 million unionized workers (Gellner and 
Robertson 2001:105).  
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Because the unit of analysis in this thesis is the party I have kept this section short. 
Additional necessary information about the unions will be included in the case description 
and method chapter. In the next section the attention will be directed towards the actual 
relationship studied and the theories about the development of the party-union ties.  
 
2.2 Introducing the mass party 
 
At the beginning of the 1950s, Duverger (1990:42) argued that political parties had changed 
from cadre parties to mass parties. Until political rights were expanded, the parties were 
based on closed off structures for the few and fortunate, gathered in so-called cadres. 
Duverger stressed that the party-change from cadre to mass parties was a gradual process and 
that voting rights did not lead to mass parties right away (Duverger 1990:43–44). The 
socialist mass parties played a central role in this process. The parties emerged outside 
national assemblies and were often based on trade union movements (Duverger 1972:24–
27,17,75). Thus, when the workers got democratic rights, both trade unions and new socialist 
parties thrived. The transformation was apparent in the party structure and among the public. 
People were more involved and a “…distinctive feature of the mass parties was their 
relationship with organizations in civil society” (Allern 2010:35). Prime examples of such 
relations where found in the northern European social democracies where close relations 
between the social democratic parties and the labour movement were a known characteristic. 
The parties and unions were part of the same labour movement, and seen as divided into two 
wings: One wing operated in the economic sphere (trade unions) and one operated in the 
political sphere (social democratic parties) (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007:607). The 
relationship between the two wings was based on a division of labour where the parties 
pursued the politics of state while the unions conducted the politics of civil society 
(Upchurch et al. 2009:2; Allern et al. 2007:607). In most European countries the two wings 
were closely connected from the founding and the relationship grew stronger through 
collective membership and financing.  
 
Duvergers hypothesis about the mass party is closely connected to the developments in 
Germany and the SPD. The scholar uses SPD and the financial ties with the union, as an 
example supporting his argument about the rise of a new mass party (Duverger 1990:44). 
Around the outbreak of the First World War the SPD had more than one million members 
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and an annual budget of nearly two million marks. In order to put up independent working-
class candidates at elections it was necessary to become independent of capitalist financing 
and this was only possible with collective financing, through for example union membership 
(Duverger 1990:44–45). Thus, the mass parties leaned on a broader, paying public, not the 
wealthy elite. Financing was a significant factor in the development towards a mass party and 
this financial linking between the party and union has continued for decades. Still, this will 
not be studied in this thesis, but is meant to illustrate how extensive the ties were and still are. 
In this thesis the focus will be on contact between the two organisations. 
 
Duverger was among the first scholars who studied the party-union relationship in Europe 
comparatively and empirically. Following Duverger, several scholars have also centred their 
studies in Europe, for instance Kitschelt (1994). The scholar groups European countries 
together based on the character and strength of the party-interest group ties (1994:225). He 
distinguishes between: Britain and Austria, Sweden and Germany, and France, Spain and 
Italy. He argued that Sweden and Germany represented an intermediate pattern, while in 
predominantly Catholic countries such as Italy and France, trade unions was less strongly 
linked with political parties (Padgett and Paterson 1991:184). In the Scandinavian countries 
the trade union movements were strong, with little fragmentation. “In practice, the weight of 
the unions in Scandinavia, financially and in terms of membership, apparently approximated 
that of the British unions.” (Allern 2010:36). The German ties were not formally established 
in the party structure, but rather based on personnel overlaps and transfers (Upchurch, Taylor, 
and Mathers 2009; Padgett and Paterson 1991). These ties are described as very close. Thus, 
Ap and SPD were founded in the cradle of social democracy and were both characterized as 
typical mass parties with close ties to the unions during the 1950s (Lees 2005:14–149; Allern 
and Heidar 2001:109). 
 
2.3 New catch-all strategies challenge the relationship 
 
During the second half of the twentieth century a weakening of party-union ties was seen in 
most European countries (Kirchheimer 1966:192–194; Katz and Mair 1995:13–15; Allern, 
Aylott, and Christiansen 2010:2–3). The decline was considered to be a result of deteriorating 
cleavages and changes in the economy and in the electorate. Societies were getting more 
pluralist and this affected the party-union membership base and the party-union ties. After the 
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Second World War, industrialized economies shifted and became increasingly based on the 
service sector. This entailed a more extensive and pluralist middle class and a reduction of 
the more traditional manual working class. The changes resulted in trade union density and 
the traditional blue-collar unions organized less of the workforce than they used to (Howell 
2001:16–18; Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009). This overall fragmentation made the 
unions less attractive for social democratic parties and vice versa.  
 
During this period the parties changed. Otto Kirchheimer’s catch-all party thesis (1966) is 
based on the parties’ new strategies during this period. The changes were, according to 
Kitschelt (1994:8–39), especially challenging for the social democratic parties. It required a 
reform of the parties’ strategies and relations with unions. The working class they emerged 
from had changed, new competition surfaced and voters moved on. In other words, exclusive 
ties with unions became less useful because ‘target voters’ did not necessarily belong to the 
unions anymore. Consequently, the social democratic parties started to look for new members 
and supporters through ‘catch all-strategies’ (Kirchheimer 1966:184–194; Allern, Aylott, and 
Christiansen 2007:610). The unions, however, no longer wanted to put all their cards in one 
basket - on one party. This reflects the cost-benefit considerations on both sides that affect 
the relationship. Howell (2001) argues that close party-union ties rest on two bargains: one 
political and one economic. “Social democratic parties and labour movements must broadly 
represent the same groups of people, and they must have something concrete to offer each 
other…” (Howell 2001:32). Thus, due to the general decline of common political and 
economic interests during the 1960s, the parties and unions adapted by loosening mutual ties.  
 
2.4 Ties replaced by cartels? 
 
Katz and Mair (1995) take the catch-all theory one step further when describing the 
detachment in the party-union relationship. The two scholars consider the mass party and 
catch-all models as different stages in a continuing process of party development where 
interests are changing and old relationships are replaced by new ones (Katz and Mair 1995:6–
8). The two scholars’ claim that parties are becoming a part of the state apparatus to secure 
their survival in a pluralist and changing environment (Katz and Mair 1995:12–15). Based on 
empirical studies in established West European countries they describe a new party that is not 
dependent on interest groups such as trade unions. The parties share a mutual interest for 
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organizational survival that change and restrains the competition between them. State 
financing and ideological convergence are factors that bind parties together and make the 
trade unions more superficial. The two scholars also underline that parties are becoming 
partnerships of professionals, not associations of, or for, the citizens - of or for the working 
class. This development is perceived as causing the leadership in particular, and parties in 
general, to form elites that control and run state-affairs. This setting is ideal for the formation 
of cartels “in which all parties share in resources and in which all survive” (Katz and Mair 
1995:16). This implies that the party-union ties are not as beneficial as they used to be. The 
parties do not need the unions – they need each other and the state.  
 
The party models presented are examples of broad theories comprising many aspects of the 
party-development. Kirchheimer and Katz and Mair worked partly inductive when 
developing their theories. The cartel party theory is based on empirical studies in Western 
European countries, but still known as a theory that generates hypotheses about the cartel 
party. Kirchheimer never presented systematic data across countries, even though he 
described a general declining trend across Europe (Allern and Bale 2012:14). Thus, there is 
no clear-cut line between theory and empirical findings in this field of research. A common 
challenge that researchers are facing when studying the party-union ties is thus to place 
themselves and their study in the landscape between empirical work and theory. It is also 
rather difficult to determine exactly how and what to study, based on these theories.  Before 
turning to empirical studies on the party-union ties it is necessary to outline the terms and 
concepts used within this field of research. 
 
2.5 A common understanding? 
 
What a party-interest group relationship actually constitutes depends on how the scholar 
perceives and further defines the relationship. There are few established definitions and 
measures of ties, which has, to some extent, limited the common ground when studying the 
relationships. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish different concepts. The following section is 
meant to enhance a better understanding of the party union landscape and identify the focus 
of this thesis. Allern and Bale’s (2012:13) table of different studies and conceptualizations is 
a suitable starting point. 
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Table 1: Conceptualization  
Examples Contact Material  Ideology Strategical  Power balance 
Ties/ 
Relations  
Collective 
membership, 
liaison committee,  
ad-hoc meetings, 
leadership overlap 
Financial 
donations, 
transfer of label, 
shared resource 
pools 
 
 
Degrees  
of ideological 
affinity 
Competitions, 
co-option, 
cooperation, etc. 
Independence, 
group 
dependence, 
party 
dependence 
Studies Duverger (1954) 
Kirchheimer 
(1966) 
von Beyme (1985) 
Thomas (2001) 
Poguntke (2002) 
Sunberg (2003) 
Allern et al (2007) 
Allern (2010) 
Rasmussen and 
Lindeboom (2013) 
Kvavik (1976) 
Wilson (1990) 
Yishai (2001) 
Sundberg (2003) 
Thomas (2001) 
Yishai (2001) 
Poguntke 
(2006) 
Thomas (2001) 
Schwartz (2005) 
Verge (2012) 
Duverger (1968) 
Kitschelt (1994) 
Mavrogordatos 
(2009) 
Source: (Allern and Bale 2012:13). 
*Some studies, such as Sundberg (2003) and Thomas (2001), combine the different understandings.  
 
In table 1, there are several terms and concepts referring to the party-union ties. It is 
necessary to sort out these different ties because the actual conceptualization is a crucial step 
when investigating party-union ties empirically. It is necessary to know exactly what is 
studied to determine which theoretical aspects are relevant.  
 
When it comes to conceptualization, most studies are steered by the research question. It 
often depends on what part of the relationship the scholar wants to study. It could also be 
determined by what the scholar assess as important or dominant, or it might boil down to the 
simple fact that different scholars have different understandings of the term relation. Kitschelt 
(1994:225) claim that trade union control of leadership appointments is key when describing 
the social democratic parties’ ties to trade unions. Others focus on financial transfers, 
collective membership or ideological dimensions (Allern and Bale 2012:11). How to assess 
the strength or existence of actual party-union ties is just as debatable as the actual 
development of the ties. In other words, there are many ways to go about when studying 
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party-union ties. This variation is also seen in the different terms used about the relationship. 
For instance, the literature about parties and interest groups show that there are many labels 
on the party-union relationship. ‘Interlinked’, ‘links’, ‘connected’ and so forth are examples 
of the variety of terms used (Allern, 2010:55). In this thesis the term tie is used about the 
party-union relation. Tie refers to how the party and unions are linked together and will be 
used consistently throughout the thesis. 
 
Most of the ties that will be described in the following section are within the contact 
category. This is mainly because research on party-union ties is within this category. The 
focus of this thesis is also within the contact category - on the unorganized, individual part of 
the party-union relation. Moreover, in this thesis the party-union ties are seen as those means 
by which the social democratic parties and trade unions may communicate (Allern 2010:57). 
Such means range from corporate membership, joint committees to elite contact, transfers 
and overlaps. Further conceptualizations of the ties studied in this thesis will be included in 
chapter 3. In the next section I will present a wide range of different ties studied. The main 
focus will be on the general empirical findings. 
 
2.5.1 An overall decline? 
 
A central part of the transformation of European Social Democracy in the period since the end of the 1970s 
has been a change in the relationship between Left parties and organized labour. The relationship between 
what were once considered the political and industrial wings of the same movement has, almost without 
exception, weakened and soured (Howell 2001:7). 
 
Several scholars confirm this notion and observe that there is a general trend of decline 
between most parties and interest groups (Thomas 2001; Allern and Bale 2012). The British 
Labour party, famous for its close union-relations, is by many perceived as a prime example 
of this overall decline in Europe (Allern and Bale 2012:14). During the 1990s Padget and 
Paterson (1991:220–222) stressed that the pace of change in party-union relationships seemed 
to differ across country borders. Thomas (2001) nuanced this finding; he discovered a decline 
in the party-union ties in democracies that have had strong left-wing governing parties (ex. 
Britain and Sweden). Yet, he finds no general trend of such decline with traditionally closely 
tied interest groups. Streeck and Hassel (Streeck and Hassel 2003:343–344) claim that party-
union ties in Western Europe have been remarkably stable in a long-term perspective. 
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Sundberg (2001:11) also find that ties between parties and unions have ‘slacked’ in the 
Nordic region. While, Allern, Aylott and Christensen (2007) find that decline is evident in 
Scandinavia, but that the trend has not been uniform. Compared to Denmark the ties are now 
stronger in Sweden and Norway. Moreover, the scholars find that “the weaker the ties were 
from the beginning, the more easily they have unraveled in response to environmental 
changes” (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007:630).  
 
The different contributions draw a picture of a general decline in the party-union ties. 
However, the trend is not as uniform as the party literature prescribes. Howell argue that the 
ties have weakened but not yet dissolved (Howell 2001:33). And, according to multiple 
studies the decline seems to vary in strength and pace across countries (Allern and Bale 2012; 
Thomas 2001). This underlines the need for more research, especially about more unexplored 
territory such as unorganized ties at the individual level. In this study, I will contribute to the 
debate by studying the personnel ties between the unions and the social democratic party’s 
parliamentary groups. I will map the actual existence of these ties and further compare the 
findings with other kinds of ties in each country. Even though there is an evident decline in 
the party-union ties there are country differences and little knowledge about the relation 
between different ties. An in-depth examination and comparison of similarities and 
differences in the ties, across the two countries, could tell us more about the ties and strength 
in general, and shed new light on what accounts for variation over time. But first, it is 
relevant to include some of the recruitment literature about members of Parliament (MPs).  
 
2.5.2 Recruitment from trade union ranks 
 
Organized parties and trade unions have a crucial role in representation, and a large part of 
parliamentary representatives have been, and possibly still are, drawn from within their ranks 
(Best and Cotta 2000:453). Recruitment and change in recruitment patterns is thus of high 
relevance when studying party-union ties on the individual level. Best and Cotta distinguish 
two processes of change in recruitment patterns: the process of democratization and the 
process of professionalization (2000:523–524). The recruitment of trade unionists or blue-
collar workers was to a great extent connected to the democratization process. Following the 
introduction of democratic rights and the mass party, organized parties and trade unions 
gained a crucial role in representation (Best and Cotta 2000:453). However, as the 
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professionalization of members of Parliament (MPs) has increased, the share of 
representatives with trade union background may have changed. Trade union experience may 
have become part of the professionalized background, or been deleted as a selection criteria.   
 
Professionalization can be interpreted in two ways (Best and Cotta 2000:334): one aspect is 
the increased workloads for politicians, which leads to full-time positions and politics 
becoming career paths, while the second aspect is the growing number of parliamentary 
representatives from the professional-intellectual strata. The increasing professionalization 
has changed the profile of politicians and the question is how this has affected the recruitment 
of union officials. Best and Cotta (2000:329)  state that the Labour party have had a tendency 
to recruit parliamentarians with a background either in trade unions or as party officials. 
According to the scholars, this is connected partly to the organisational structure and partly to 
the professionalization. Thus, union elites may be seen as part of the professionalization 
trend. From the 1970s there was a turnaround in most European countries including Germany 
“…the overall increase in recruitment of party functionaries, experience in party or trade 
union jobs (our so-called party functionaries) has lost its influence as a factor of 
importance…” (Cotta and Best 2007:152). They refer to von Beyme (Beyme 1993:121) and 
note that despite that a considerable percentage among the prominent politicians in the 1970s 
had trade union roots, the impact of these organisations on political recruitment was of minor 
importance (Cotta and Best 2007:157). 
 
Informal societal norms within the party are factors that influence the recruitment of MPs. 
Since the 1960s these criteria have changed and there are new expectations and requirements 
to the candidate lists in regards to for instance gender balance, education and minority 
representation (Allern, Karlsen, and Narud 2014:2). Findings from Norway and Germany 
show that the development in the societal background of the parliamentary candidates has 
been somewhat similar. Women and ‘professional’ politicians are increasingly represented, 
as well as people with higher education (Allern, Karlsen, and Narud 2014:18; Best and Cotta 
2000:187–190). The lists over informal norms as selection criteria seem to have expanded 
over the years and thus union background may have more competition from other criteria. To 
stay within the scope of the thesis I will not specify all internal nomination criteria and 
recruitment norms in Ap and SPD. However, the empirical studies about such criteria and 
recruitment show that there is few, if none, studies focusing solemnly on trade union 
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background as selection criteria. Hence, the share of MPs who holds or has held an official 
trade union position is unknown. This thesis will hopefully fill some of this knowledge gap.  
 
2.6 Summary 
 
The party-union relationship has taken many forms and developed differently across 
countries, but the existence of the relationship is seldom debated. In accordance with the 
introduction of universal suffrage and the industrial revolution the old cadre parties were 
introduced to competition. As described by Duverger, mass parties surfaced and were 
founded on a strong membership base in social groups. The new parties were mostly socialist 
or social democratic parties, often with close relations to industrial workers organized in 
trade unions. The two organisations shared interests, which strengthened the ties and 
affiliation between the parties and unions. Still, the mass party is seen as part of one phase in 
a continuing process. The next stage entailed a more pluralistic society with fluctuating 
voters, which led to weaker party-union ties. Kirchheimer’s catch-all thesis portrays new 
strategies to handle this change. The struggle for votes compromised the party-union ties. 
Katz and Mair take this argument one step further and assert that the state has become a 
significant actor that both parties and unions seek directly. This induces change and an 
overall decline in the party-union relationship.  
 
Summarized, the party literature reviewed creates a picture of a dwindling party-union 
relationship, which also finds empirical support. Based on the party theories presented and 
general empirical review, it seems as if the general decline is becoming a common truth. 
However, the trend is not uniform and varies in strength and across countries. If the decline 
includes parliamentary representatives with union background is rather undetermined and 
there seems to be few studies where trade union background aggregated as personnel party-
union ties is studied. The mapping in this thesis will hopefully contribute with new 
knowledge on the party-union decline by focusing on Norway and Germany. To examine if 
there is an actual decline in personnel ties it is thus necessary to include the party-union 
development in Norway and Germany, and further review the literature about the actual 
existence of ties in the two countries.  
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3 Norway and Germany 
 
In this chapter the historic development of the party-union relationship in Norway and 
Germany will be presented. There will also be an empirical review of the literature about the 
existent ties in the two countries. The objective is to review the development in light of the 
declining trends described in the previous chapter, and accordingly, situate the two cases and 
the different ties. In chapter 6 I will compare the findings from the mapping with the historic 
development and existent ties reviewed in this chapter.  
 
This chapter can be divided intro three sections. The first section will include the major 
historic developments in each country. The second section will include further 
conceptualisation of the different ties studied and compared, and a more specific literature 
review of the different ties existent in the two countries. In the third section I will outline 
what precisely will be studied and further derive some expectations that will structure and 
guide the mapping and comparison in this thesis. These expectations will be based on the 
theoretical and empirical reviews from chapter 2, and the following chapter, including the 
historic development and empirical reviews of the different ties in Norway and Germany.  
 
3.1 Ap and LO: twins from the start 
 
In Norway, the party-union relationship formally surfaced in 1887 when the Norwegian 
Labour party (Ap) was founded by trade unionists in Arendal (Bull 1985:368–171). The 
founding of Ap was based on the fight for labour rights and the first years after the formation 
the party was the link between different local trade unions. Moreover, at the beginning the 
labour party and trade union was one organizational entity (Allern and Heidar 2001:106–
107). The national trade union, LO, was established in 1899 (Bull 1985:461).  One main 
discussion was how LO should be affiliated with Ap. Eventually, it was decided that they 
would continue a partnership with mutual representation at each other's governing bodies 
(Allern and Heidar 2001:107). This marked the start of a continuous debate about the 
relationship between these two organizations that has shaped the relationship ever since.  
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According to Maurseth (1987:47¨), endorsed collective membership was one of the 
cornerstones in the party-union relationship. Other organisational agreements also tied the 
two together, for instance common meetings and joint committees. The personnel overlaps 
were also usual among the elites, were leaders had official positions in both camps (Allern 
and Heidar 2001:107). During the 1920s LO and Ap was described as Siamese twins, tied 
together on almost all levels (Maurseth 1987:47). Despite being remarkably close there were 
internal disputes in the labour movement and the Labour party was divided twice during the 
1920s (1921 and 1923), when the social democratic party and the communist party were 
founded (ibid). This did not last for long. In 1927 the three parties gathered again and the 
Cooperation Committee and the mutual representation with LO was again established (Allern 
and Heidar 2001:108). During the 1930s-1940s Ap aimed for governmental power and the 
party turned towards a broader working class. Whilst LOs main task was to support Ap’s 
minority government, especially the party’s economic policy during the financial crisis 
(Pryser 1988). After the Second World War the collective membership number was still high 
and relationship continued to be close (Allern and Heidar 2001:108). The party-union 
relationship was part of a social democratic peak during the 1950s and about 15 per cent of 
the members of the party’s executive committee (including deputy members) were part of the 
LO Secretariat (Allern and Heidar 2001:123). The leadership in LO accepted the 
government’s long-term aim of stability in the labour market and the policy of limited wage 
growth. The Cooperation Committee was essential to coordinate these policy positions so that 
they had a public united front. The 1940-50s can be characterized as a prime time for the 
labour party with over 40 per cent of the vote and governmental power (Allern and Heidar 
2001; Bergh 1987).  
 
The labour-wind shifted at the beginning of the 1960s and ideological differences within Ap 
surfaced (Nyhamar 1990). This led to a short radical wave during the 1960s and 1970s. First, 
when the socialist party (SF) separated and later when the Labour party (Ap) where in 
Government and intervened in central negotiations about wage settlements (Bergh 1987; 
Sundberg 2001). SF was founded six months before the 1961-election and the new party 
gained mandates in constituencies where Ap lost ground (Bergh 1987:328–230). After this 
period the settlements were left to the labour market and Ap started the revising of party 
principles (ibid). During this period, LO was also developing a new action program 
(handlingsprogram) called “program 69”, which caused ideological debates in all camps of 
the labour movement (Nyhamar 1990:64–69). The program was the first of its kind and was 
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meant to strengthen the party-union relationship. It outlined the division of labour between 
the party and union, where LO was responsible for tariff and income related issues, while Ap 
was responsible for more general political issues (Nyhamar 1990:70–71).  
 
At the beginning of the 1970s the main political tension in Norway was about EU- 
membership (Nyhamar 1990). There were many internal discussions within the labour 
movement before both Ap and LO officially announced their support for membership. This 
led to the breakout of a resistance group within Ap called AIK (Nyhamar 1990:168–191). In 
1972 the Norwegian majority voted no in a EU-referendum and in 1973 the Communist 
party, SF and the remaining fraction of AIK established a common election-list that 
eventually led to the new socialist party SV (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) (ibid). Despite the 
1973 election disaster, Ap gained governmental power and kept it in the 1977-election. 
However, in 1981 the so-called Right wing wave caused a set-back for the labour movement 
and internal discussions about freedom and the balance between state and marked arose 
(Nyhamar 1990:384–392, 505–510). Ap was becoming more open and started to engage in 
cooperation with other interest groups (Allern 2010:131). This period marked a decline in the 
party-union relationship, which intensified during the 1997 election. Ap’s election result did 
not pass the 36,9 minimum threshold sat by party leader Jagland and thus Ap left the 
governmental offices (Løset 2009). After the election the labour movement was shaken and 
internal debates about the party-union relationship arose. It was once again decided upon 
support for a close party-union relationship. At the 2002 party congress the party-union 
relationship was on the agenda, and the conclusion was not to weaken the existing ties but to 
continue the close relationship (Allern 2010:131). Prior to this the LO congress had come to 
the same conclusion; continue close relations with Ap.  
 
3.2 SPD and DGB: fairly strong on the individual level 
 
Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) was formally founded in 1875 as a fusion of a 
Marxist and reformist group (ADV and SAP) (Berman 1998:73). The party was founded 
prior to the DGB (founded in 1949), and there have not been any formal affiliation or 
financial agreement between the party and the union (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009; 
Dribbush and Birke 2012:3). Moreover, compared to the Scandinavian unions the West 
Germany unions guarded their autonomy (Padgett and Paterson 1991:180–181). Still, the ties 
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between the two organizations have been strong on the individual level through personnel 
overlaps and transfers (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009:4). As in Norway, there was 
fractioning within the SPD during the 1920s. For instance, in 1917, those opposed to the war 
broke off from the party and formed a new party called the Independent Social Democratic 
party of Germany (USDP) (Berman 1998:132–133). During the post-war period the labour 
movement was far from united and according to Upchurch and colleagues (2009) the “events 
of 1919 and beyond conditioned ideological position of German social democracy and its 
associated model of trade unionism” (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009:57). During this 
period the concept of economic democracy became enshrined in principles of co-
determination (as an adjunct of liberal political democracy). These principles are described as 
part of the German model for social democratic trade unionism (ibid). For instance, co-
determination gave workers the right to participate in management of the companies they 
worked for. Workers Councils were established and several agreements and laws secured 
union involvement. However, the war buried the principles, and the reestablishment of co-
determination was no automatic process after the war (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 
2009:56–58). When Germany was divided after the Second World War the workers from the 
East were separated from the rest and this reduced a significant share of the manual working 
class as well as the parliamentary representatives with union background. This is referred to 
as one factor that led the German SPD to employ catch- all strategies to appeal to the ‘middle 
ground’ electorate (Howell 2001:22).  
 
During the post-war period there were intense discussions in West Germany about the re-
establishing of unions. In 1949 a compromise was made, the agreement entailed that the there 
would be a confederation, Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB, and that there was to be 16 
independent industrial unions. Hans Böckler, SPD member of the Reichstag (1928-33) and 
district secretary of an SPD union organization (Upchurch et al. 2009:60-63) was elected as 
the first Chairman of DGB. Despite discussions, a deal about co-determination was made and 
a form of restricted co-determination was applied in the coal and steel industries. SPD 
supported the principles of co-determination and imposed several amendments to this 
Mitbewtimmung. For instance, in 1972 the SPD- Government allowed more organized 
contact between the union and Works Council and enhanced the power of the Councils 
themselves (Upchurch et al. 2009:62-63). These acts and amendments was part of the so-
called Modell Deutschland, which ensured peaceful cooperation with unions through 
legislation, stabilized collective bargaining, and the Work Councils. The latter constrained 
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unions’ influence at the workplace and kept the West German workers satisfied - as long as 
the Modell managed to deliver rising real incomes (Upchurch et al. 2009:53). This was also 
conditioned by a strong and thriving German economy, which was the case in Germany for 
several years. 
 
Still, some economic difficulties ceased Germany during the 1960s and as a result a phase of 
‘Concerted Action’ between the Government, employers and unions was introduced. This 
was to reduce wage growth as a counter inflationary measure (Upchurch et al. 2009:64-65). 
During this period SPD was thrown into a crisis of identity and was led to new strategies to 
gather votes; seeking votes beyond the traditional workers. When the Bad Godesberg 
programme of the SPD was presented in 1959, a redefined social democracy was put 
forward. Despite these new efforts, other movements challenged SPDs hegemony on the left 
and “the SPD no longer had a monopoly ideological hold over workers and their 
expectations” (Upchcurch et al. 2009:65). In 1980 the West German Green party was 
founded and despite the SPD-strategy to win back the ‘Greens’ the Green party continued to 
be a factor that left the SPD faced with programmatic and strategic dilemmas during the 
1980s. In the following decade (1990s) the Model Deutschland came to a halt and this 
sparked the underlying clash between capital and workers’ interests. Upchurch describes this 
as the root to the development of a current crisis of German social democratic trade unionism 
(ibid). During this period the right and left wings within the party went head to head. The left 
wing of the SPD claimed that the welfare state was curtailed through reform programs such 
as the Agenda 2010, which was endorsed by right-wing social democrats in 2003. This led to 
“…the process of alienation between the party (represented by the leadership) and its core 
clientele (including trade unions)…” (Faas 2010:895). It resulted in the foundation of a new 
party, WASG (Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit - Die Wahlalternative) (Patton 2013:221–222). 
Although the WASG strove to establish itself nationwide, it was much stronger in western 
Germany and in June 2005, the mostly eastern party, PDS, and WASG struck a deal and the 
Left Party (Die Linke) was established. The labour movement was yet again split based on 
ideological differences and challenged from the left (Silvia and Vale 1992).  
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3.3 Organized and unorganized forms of contact 
 
In chapter 2 (2.5) the party-union ties were placed within the category of contact and defined 
as those means by which the social democratic parties and trade unions may communicate 
(Allern 2010:57). Since contact is a broad term it is necessary to organize the different ties 
that may open up for contact. Allern (2010:59) distinguish between the following three 
categories of links opening up for contact between parties and unions.   
 
1. Overlapping organizational structures (e.g. links formalised in party/union rules 
2. Inter-organizational ties (e.g. joint committees) 
3. Unorganized ties for contact (informal contact or personnel overlaps/transfers) 
 
When using these categories the main challenge is to capture all relevant information - all 
kinds of ties and contact. Since the party-union ties often are referred to in terms of formal or 
informal degrees of contact, there is most likely a broader field of information that might be 
missed by using these categories. However, the difference between what is formal and what 
is informal is not always sufficient and miss important qualities (Allern and Bale 2014:10). 
Using such broad terms might threaten the accuracy in the conceptualization, and further 
cause confusion in regards to what is actually studied and what the results really disclose. 
Thus, the categories outlined are meant to systematize actual contact in terms of 
organizational degree. The categories are a way of narrowing the scope and defining - as 
accurate as possible - the small part of the party-union relationship that will be studied in this 
thesis. The organizational categories can be seen as degrees of institutionalisation. In other 
words: “…the degree to which a structured and often highly formalized system or set of 
arenas in which interaction takes place exist” (Allern and Bale 2014:10).  Still, degree of 
institutionalisation does not solemnly reflect degree of closeness or strength. Significant ties 
can also materialize outside well-organized settings.  
 
Within each category there are different kinds of ties. The two categories comprising more 
organized ties (1,2) and include known official links such as joint committees, and less 
visible arrangements such as tacit (not written but de facto official) agreements about mutual 
representation in national decision-making bodies. These ties are also examples of ties that 
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are documented and that have been studied. Scholars know less about the unorganized ties of 
contact that is studied in this thesis.  
 
There are two kinds of unorganized ties for contact at the individual level: unorganized 
meetings that are not reported but happen regularly, and personnel overlaps and transfers 
(Allern, 2010:59). The overlaps and transfers can be based on informal norms that are 
difficult to trace, but very much existent. Many overlaps and transitions may indicate that 
informal norms exist and that they are examples of strong party-union ties. Moreover, these 
ties are within the contact-category, but are not examples of direct contact between 
representatives. The ties refer to technical aspects such as organized or unorganized features, 
not substantial value in terms of political significance or influence (Allern and Bale 2014). 
The strength of the ties will be assessed based on actual frequency. The framework that will 
be used to evaluate the strength of the ties will be outlined in chapter 4. However, before the 
method and data will be presented it is necessary to review the empirical documentation that 
does exist about different ties within the three categories. In the next section I will elaborate 
further on the development of the relationship, focusing on the actual ties linking the party 
and union together.  
 
3.4 Documented ties in Norway and Germany 
 
In this section the secondary literature about existing ties will be presented. This is meant to 
give a clear understanding of the actual extent of other kinds of ties in the two countries and 
further be basis for the expectations outlined in the last section of this chapter. In chapter 6, 
the ties from the following review will be compared with the personnel ties mapped in the 
thesis. 
 
3.4.1 Ap-LO ties  
 
Despite continuous discussions in both LO and Ap, the party-union ties has been and still are, 
based on a broad range of ties (Allern 2010). Until 1920 Ap was linked to LO at the national 
level by guaranteeing leaders formal access to the party’s executive bodies. The party-union 
relationship was thus of a strong, organized character (Allern 2010:132–133). However, since 
the party split during the 1920s there has been no strong tie between the party and union of an 
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equal character. The party-union ties in the Scandinavian countries have been described as 
remarkably close, yet, in the early 1970s a decline was also evident in the region (Allern, 
Aylott, and Christiansen 2007). In Norway the first sign of decline was seen in 1969, when 
the rule (paragraph 14) that said that all party members ‘should’ join a LO union was relaxed 
(Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007:614). The basis for collective affiliation was thus 
weakened and many branches ended their affiliation to the party. In 1989 only twenty-four 
per cent of the party members were collectively affiliated with LO. The requirement that all 
party members should be members of an LO union, was suggested deleted by the internal 
party committee in 2000 (Allern 2010:140). However, the proposal was rejected and today 
the recommendation still stands; the 2013 party statuets (paragraph 13, article 5) note that if 
party members have access, they should register as a member of LO (Arbeiderpartiet 2013).  
 
One of the most recent studies from Norway conclude that the party-union relationship is still 
fairly close (Allern 2010). In the early 2000s the relationship is even characterized by strong 
inter-organisational ties on the national level (Allern 2010:146). For instance, the standing 
joint committee (Cooperation Committee) between LO and the Ap still regularly bring 
together the top leaders of both organizations to discuss political and organizational issues 
(Allern 2010; Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007:615). The forum hosts discussions on a 
broad range of political and organizational issues concerning the two organizations. Joint 
conventions have also been held regularly, and from time to time there have been established 
temporary sub-committees. Ap even has special written agreements with some of the unions 
organized under LO. In addition, LO and its individual unions are always invited to Ap’s 
party congress and conference (Allern 2010:135). It is tradition for the LO chair to formally 
address the biannual party congress in plenum and the LO-leader usually chairs the internal 
election committee in Ap and joint conventions are held regularly2. When Labour is in 
Government the joint Committee invites ministers and state secretaries to report on political 
issues and discuss the union leaders views on relevant issues (Allern 2010:134). The party 
leader and the secretary also attend the meetings of LO’s general council (without formal 
right to speak) (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2010:7). Even though the Ap manifesto is 
not on the Cooperation Committes’ agenda (formally autonomous) at least one LO 
representative is by common practice a member of Ap’s manifesto Committee (Allern 
                                                        
2 This practice was Suspended in 2007, but this was most likely due to special circumstances around the 
resignation of the Chair (Valla) because of her conflict with an LO employee (Allern 2010:36). 
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2010:136). Thus, there are plenty of common practices and rules at the organizational level 
that continue to tie Ap and LO together. 
 
There have not been any formal rules of reciprocal representation between Ap and LO since 
the 1920s (Allern and Heidar 2001:122). Still, in 2000 39 per cent of the Ap congress 
delegates were former or current officials in LO or other LO unions (Heidar and Saglie 
2003:279). The trade union movement has given Ap many activists and leaders during the 
years. According to Allern (2010:140) informal rules still dictate that LO and its unions 
should be represented in the party’s executive committee. A survey conducted in 2003/2004 
maps the Ap elite’s overlaps and transfers outside parliament (Allern 2010:139). It shows that 
more than 20 per cent of the party’s top elite holds or have held positions in LO. More 
precisely, when the survey was conducted 14 per cent of Ap’s elite were currently officials in 
LO or LO unions locally or nationally. 19 per cent had been LO union officials before they 
were elected to the party’s national executive. When taking into account elite members who 
were, or had been union staff, the total share of elite members with current (2003/2004) or 
former trade union positions was almost 40 per cent (Allern, 2010:140).  
  
The actual contact between Ap and LO outside formal committees and forums has also been 
examined. More than 70 per cent of the respondents had contact with LO and LO unions 
monthly or more (Allern, 2010:142). Almost 30 per cent had contact on a weekly basis. In 
addition, the study uncovers that Ap’s executive members and national political advisors also 
had contact with union representatives independently of official meetings. Thus, the 
Norwegian Ap seems to continue close ties with LO outside organized settings. Still, in 2007 
the elite level of the party-union relationship was strained (Allern 2010:282). This was partly 
due to LO-chair Gerd Liv Valla’s public critique of the Government coalition’s (Ap included) 
policy on several issues, and partly due to internal disputes in LO that ended in Valla’s 
resignation. This illustrates the fluctuation in the relationship. The overall picture is one of 
decline, however, empirical studies of different ties have also shown that the ties are still very 
much present, especially through informal rules and contact. There is little knowledge about 
how the party-union ties have developed since Valla resigned. There is thus a need for further 
inquiries on the actual strength and variation over time in unorganized ties.  
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3.4.2 SPD-DGB ties 
 
There are few studies mapping the actual party-union ties in Germany. Allern and Bale 
(forthcoming) are in the process of mapping the existent ties and thus this chapter will review 
some of the preliminary findings from their studies. The two scholars find that there are some 
enduring links at the organisational level connecting DGP to SPD’s central organisations3. 
These links are tacit agreements about one-sided/mutual representation in national decision-
making bodies and regular meetings between party and confederation. Moreover, the German 
DGB is reported to have ex officio representation in the SPD’s national council and actual 
formal rights to send delegates to the party congress (Allern and Bale forthcoming). They 
also discover that there are agreements about temporary joint committees in policy issues. 
Jacobey and Behrens (2014) support these findings and argue that the party-union ties 
remains intact in Germany. For instance, despite disputes over major labour market and 
pension reforms by the SPD government in the early 2000s, the unions and SPD avoided a 
clear break: they sustained joint committees, such as the Gewerkschaftsrat.  
 
More unorganized ties on the individual level has been seen as the most evident ties in 
Germany (Padgett and Paterson 1991; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013; Upchurch, 
Taylor, and Mathers 2009). Almost three fourths of the SPD Bundestag representatives were 
members of the DGB at the beginning of the twentieth century (Gellner and Robertson 
2001:112). There has been an overlap between union membership and the party electorate for 
a long time (Padgett and Paterson 1991:181–182). Such personnel links are also evident on 
the parliamentarians and minister level. For instance, in 1924 about 50 per cent of the 
German Socialist MPs had previously been appointed in leading positions in the party’s 
administration or in related organisations, such as trade unions (Cotta and Best 2007:145). 
Another example is from 2012 when the SPD made Guntram Schneider, the long-time state-
level president of the DGB union confederation, its Labour Minister. In addition, in 2013 the 
SPD nominated Klaus Wiesehügel, president of the construction workers union (IG BAU), as 
Labour Minister in its shadow cabinet and “In doing so, the SPD is renewing an old tradition 
whereby this position is to be occupied by a representative of its major ally, the unions” 
(Jacoby and Behrens 2014:2). 
                                                        
3 The scholars have asked both confederation and party about the existence of every kind of ties and created a 
data set of dichotomous links (Allern and Bale Forthcoming 13). The data is also supplied by information from 
the party statutes and from key informants.  
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During the 1970s the DGB became a more authoritative institution, respected by most 
political actors and organisations. Still, the member unions continued to exercise autonomy in 
for instance wage bargaining. Padgett and Paterson (1991:181) describe DGB as a supra-
partisan union, independent of the SPD. This entailed that the union did not support the party 
financially nor did they campaign openly for the party. This stems mostly from the need to 
accommodate the non-socialist elements within the union (ibid). However, according to 
Jacobey and Behrens at the end of the 1990s the DGB also campaigned for the SPD (2014:6) 
which is a newer practice from the union. Despite this formal distance the DGB and the SPD 
have maintained close informal alignment and  “Trade union leaders have occupied positions 
in the party elite and have not been slow to involve themselves fully in internal party life” 
(Padgett and Paterson 1991:181). A significant amount of union members has also been 
representatives in Parliament and when SPD have been in Government there have mostly 
been trade union presences as well. Still, there seems to be little prior research on the actual 
personnel ties. Moreover, there are no comprehensive data sets existing (to my knowledge). 
Since the unorganized ties are claimed to be what ultimately ties the party and unions 
together in Germany, it is surprising that there is so little empirical evidence available. This 
underlines the need for the mapping of personnel ties, which is the objective in this thesis. 
 
3.5 Moving forward: Expectations and outline of study 
 
Because there are few empirical studies about personnel party-union ties, information and 
guidance on the way to proceed is scarce. This makes the study somewhat pioneering, but 
also challenging to fully outline from start to finish. However, based on the two previous 
chapters it is possible to define some expectations that will guide the mapping and analysis. 
This study is thus of a deductive character and in the next section I will outline what I expect 
to find. 
 
The historical overview has showed that the party-union ties in Germany and Norway have 
been strong. During the first half of the twentieth century they continued to be strong and 
materialized through for instance joint committees or more personnel ties. In accordance with 
the mass party theory (Duverger 1990) the relationship was strong and extensive in both 
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countries during the 1950s. The first expectation is thus that the ties in both countries were 
strong in 1957.  
 
After the Second World War most Norwegian social democrats came to terms with liberal 
capitalism, and as such, ideology was marginalized (Allern 2010:127). Still, there was a 
radical wave during the 1960s and 1970s with the outbreak of SF and later when the Labour 
party where in Government and intervened in central negotiations about wage settlements 
(Bergh 1987; Sundberg 2001). During the 1970s and 80s Ap started the revising of party 
principles (ibid). Following this revising a debate about freedom and the balance between 
state and marked arose. Such ideological debates were also evident in the German party-
union development. According to Padgett and Paterson, a new generation of ideologically 
motivated middle class activists entered SPD between 1969 and 1972 and criticised the SPDs 
lack of ideological purpose (1991:52). Questions about SPDs character and ideology took 
centre stage - in accordance with the new politics of postmaterialism. These questions 
continued into the 2000s and resulted in the outbreak of Die Linke. The internal debates are 
reflected in the decline of overlapping membership, in both Norway and Germany. Deduced 
from the catch-all theory, the historic development and the empirical evidence about a 
decline in other ties, the main expectation is that the personnel ties have declined since 1957.  
 
The empirical studies also confirm that there has been and still are party-union ties present in 
Norway and Germany. However, the character and strength of these ties differ in the two 
countries. Norway has had a broad range of ties, with especially strong organized ties such as 
recommended collective affiliation and joint committees. In Germany the unorganized ties 
have been most apparent according to several scholars. The last expectation is thus, that the 
personnel ties in Germany are consistently stronger than the Norwegian ties.  
 
The three main expectations in this thesis are: 
E1: The personnel ties in Germany and Norway were strong during the first period (1957-
1961). 
E2: The personnel ties have declined between 1957 and the current period (2013-2017).  
E3: The personnel ties in Germany are consistently stronger than the personnel ties in 
Norway 
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The expectations are illustrated in figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Expected extent and development of personnel ties in Norway and Germany from 
1957 to 2017 
 
In addition to these expectations the research questions defined in chapter 1 will guide the 
mapping and further discussions. There are thus some additional distinctions that must be 
made before turning to the research design and analyses.  
 
First of all, I will distinguish between national and lower levels when mapping the ties. This 
is because the nomination and recruitment to parliament are affected by geographical 
considerations in both countries. In Norway, this was even evident through legislation that 
was meant for stimulating broad geographical representation (Allern, Karlsen, and Narud 
2014). In Germany the two-tier canal into parliament is also meant as a guarantee for a 
geographical representation (Lees 2005). The geographical considerations are important 
because they are a democratic thermometer regarding the distance between the governed and 
those who govern. This aspect leads to an important divide between the two cases studied: 
Germany is a federal state, while Norway is a unitary state. There are over 80 million people 
in Germany, while there are 5 million in Norway. The distance between the people and the 
rulers seems to be shorter in Norway. The system also implies that the state level is more 
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significant in Germany than in Norway. In the analysis I will thus divide between national 
level and lower levels. The main focus is the national level. However, since Germany is a 
federal state, the divide is necessary and might give interesting insight to level differences.  
 
The second distinction is between overlaps and transfers. There are several reason for 
studying both personnel overlaps and transfers. First, as a consequence of the 
professionalization of politics most official positions are full-time positions. It is becoming 
increasingly difficult to juggle a full-time parliamentary seat with other official positions 
(Allern 2010:60). It is thus likely that transfers occur as often, or even more often than, actual 
overlaps. Second, there seems to be more considerations in regards to wearing two “hats” at 
the same time. This implies the problem of mixing roles and avoiding conflict of interest 
(Yishai 1991:31). Finally, in this study - with limited prior data - it is better to have a broader 
approach when mapping the field to capture as much information as possible. I perceive 
overlaps and transfers as the most feasible differentiation based on the data accessible.  
 
Finally, the last research question about the cohesion of different ties will be the main focus 
of chapter 6. The comparison will be based on the secondary literature presented in this 
chapter. Allern and Bale (2014:11) underlines that it is no requirement for the existence of a 
relationship that all three classes of ties are present. Thus, the various classes are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Still, the three classes of ties should be seen as part of a 
bigger picture. The decline of one type of organized tie may affect, explain or shed light on 
the development of an unorganized tie. For instance, the rate of party-union personnel 
overlaps and transfers may be conditioned by the strength of inter-organizational ties. 
Compared to Norway, the party-union ties in Germany have been less organized and based 
on personal contact rather than collective affiliation (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 
2009:53). The fact that different ties are present, but vary in character and strength in the two 
countries, makes a comparison of the different ties interesting. Moreover, by conducting a 
mapping and comparison of personnel ties with other ties, I will attempt to bring something 
new to the scientific debate. This might lead to a better understanding of the relation between 
different ties. Thus, in this thesis three aspects of the party-union ties are examined and 
compared: variation in personnel ties over time; variation in the development of personnel 
ties between Norway and Germany; and a comparison of the personnel ties and other more 
organized ties.  
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4 Research Design 
 
In this chapter I will present the data and the method applied in this study. First, I will review 
the comparative case study. This will include a description of the two cases, as well as the 
generalization potential and aims of the study. Second, I will present the time periods 
included in the analyses and give a short description of the election systems and nomination 
procedures in each country. This is because recruitment to parliament is indirectly studied 
and thus these aspects should be considered when interpreting the results. Third, the method 
and data will be described. In this section I will also present the operationalization of 
personnel ties and the framework used to assess the strength of the ties. Further, the process 
of collecting data and coding will be described. Finally, the challenges and comparison 
potential will be discussed.  
 
4.1 Comparative case study with an exploratory element 
 
This thesis is a comparative case study where personnel party-union ties in Norway and 
Germany are examined and compared. Moreover, the study is a comparative case study of 
variation over time, mapping parliamentary representatives who hold or have held an official 
position in a trade union. According to Gerring (2007:19) a case study may be understood as 
the intensive study of a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in 
time or over some period of time. This study is an example of the latter, and in accordance 
with the start of the party-union decline, it spans from 1957 till the current parliamentary 
period (2013-2017). Levy (2008:5) emphasizes that case studies can play different roles at 
different stages in research programs. They can test, refine and sharpen existing hypothesis or 
generate new ones. This study coincides with this notion; the study is deductive, yet with an 
exploratory element. I will not test hypotheses directly, but rather refine or sharpen the notion 
of the party-union decline, and hopefully generate new hypotheses about the party-union ties. 
The research questions and the expectations outlined previously (introduction chapter and 
chapter 3) will structure the collection of empirical evidence. The overarching aim is to map 
the personnel ties in Norway and Germany and further, to discuss the findings relative to the 
expectations outlined. Moreover, since the purpose of a case study should be “at least in part 
– to shed light on a larger class of cases” (Gerring 2007:19) I seek to shed light on the 
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common understanding of a general decline in the party-union relationship by comparing the 
two cases and by comparing the findings with other kinds of ties. Since most case studies 
have limited generalisation potential the hope is that the mapping will contribute with 
important data, which could lead to studies where broader generalisation is possible.  
 
The case selection is important in this respect. If relevant and comparable cases are selected, 
they can facilitate new knowledge and fill information gaps on party-union ties. As there are 
few studies on personnel ties, a balance between depth and breadth regarding design and case 
selection is necessary, or as Tarrow (2010:246) puts it: “the move from single-case 
comparison to paired comparison offers a balanced combination of descriptive depth and 
analytical challenge that progressively declines as more cases are added”. This assertion 
summarizes some of the rationale for comparing the personnel ties in Norway and Germany. 
Except from the obvious notion that two cases tell us more than one, two cases can 
potentially bring something new to the debate and still keep some of the depth needed when 
exploring new ground.  
 
The dependent variable in this thesis is the personnel party-union ties, operationalized as MPs 
who hold or have held an official position in a union. Since this is a mapping of variation on 
the dependent variable, independent variables are not directly studied in this thesis. Still, the 
comparative design will hopefully uncover some possible variables that can be used in future 
studies to explain variation. Thus, when analyzing the data I will focus on both what is 
coherent and what differs between the two countries. As implied in the theory and literature 
chapters, both Germany and Norway have traditionally close party-union ties that have seen a 
decline in recent years. Thus, in this study the case selection is close to a crucial case design 
(Gerring 2007:89). If party-union ties are declining and have been declining across Europe, 
Norway and Germany should be examples of such trends in personnel ties as well. Still, as 
underlined in chapter two and three, several studies show that the party-union decline is not 
uniform across Europe and that the actual empirical evidence about the unorganized 
individual side is limited. The comparison of these two cases can thus enlighten us about the 
factors that determine where the ties can make it or not make it.  
 
Moreover, there are several reasons why Norway is an appropriate country for this 
comparative study. First of all, Norway is one of the countries where there has been an 
evident decline in the party-union ties, starting in 1969. Allern (2010) underlines the decline 
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in Norway, but also shows that the trend is not as clear-cut as presumed. Other Scandinavian 
studies point in the same direction – there is a lack of consistency (Allern, Aylott, and 
Christiansen 2007). To gain better insight to this lack of consistency and what it entails, the 
study of Norway can be fruitful. Second, Norway’s geographical location and features makes 
it a comparable case within Europe. Moreover, the Norwegian case represents the 
Scandinavian region. Norway is also comparable with other European countries where party-
union ties have been traditionally close, for example Germany. Norway is one of the few 
countries where there exist systematic empirical studies covering a wide range of ties4. Such 
prior knowledge makes comparison over time and within the case feasible. The possibility of 
comparing results may strengthen the validity of the findings. Third, there are fewer practical 
challenges. Because I am a Norwegian student it is easier to access, collect and understand 
the data. This reduces the workload and makes it possible to include another case without 
stretching the scope of the thesis. The comparative approach with the Norwegian Ap-LO ties 
as one case will hopefully give a better overview of the variation over time, as well as an in-
depth look at personnel ties. 
 
I have also chosen to study the personnel ties between SPD and DGB in Germany. First of 
all, the general party-union ties have been fairly strong in Germany as well and thus this 
enables insight to how different degrees of formalization might affect the strength of the 
relationship over time. Second, since Kirchheimer (1966) more or less based his catch-all 
thesis on the German case, the decline of ties in Germany is interesting in itself.  Third, the 
personnel ties are claimed to be the strongest form of ties in Germany (Upchurch, Taylor, and 
Mathers 2009), while other kinds of ties are presumably not as present. Fourth, the empirical 
evidence on personnel ties is surprisingly scarce and this makes the case both challenging and 
important to study. Finally, the fact that the German case is similar to the Norwegian - 
traditionally strong party-union ties and the following decline - also makes it an interesting 
case for comparison. A comparative case study of the cases from Norway and Germany will 
provide new data, and clarify the actual existence of personnel ties in the two countries. The 
comparison might also give insight to the relation between different ties.  In turn, this may be 
significant for the literature on party-union ties. To get one step closer to the aims set out in 
this thesis it is necessary to outline the actual process of collecting and preparing data for 
                                                        
4 Sundberg 2001 and Allern 2010. 
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analysis. The next section reviews the time periods chosen, and summarizes the choices I 
have made regarding method and data. 
 
4.2 Time periods, cabinets and nomination 
 
I have chosen four parliamentary periods in Norway and Germany. The periods are selected 
with a semi-fixed frequency of four and five years. The periods in Germany are: 1957-61, 
1976-1980, 1994-1998 and the current period that started in 2013-2017. The periods in 
Norway are: 1957-61, 1977- 1981, 1997-2001 and 2013-2017. Even though there are 
standard four-year parliamentary periods in both countries, the second and third periods differ 
in Germany. This is due to political and historic events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Two months after the Wall fell (1990) a new election was held. This was not the only early 
election in Germany during the 1970s and 1980s, however, this election marks a change in 
the total number of seats in the Bundestag (Berntzen 2013:226–229). The periods prior to the 
fall only includes parliamentary representatives from the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Western part). This also marks a shift in membership numbers in both SPD and DGB, which 
is important to keep in mind when analyzing the data.  
 
To adapt to such changes I have adjusted the frequency of the selected periods in Germany. 
The main incentive is to have four periods from each country and have similar starting and 
ending periods. This will keep the selection biases similar across cases. The choice of the first 
period was made in accordance with the prescribed decline in the catch-all thesis. Since the 
weakening of ties is assumed to have started in the 1960s, the timespan of this study starts in 
1957. The period is the last parliamentary period during the 1950s in both countries.  
 
Another notion is that the current parliamentary period is not over yet. Thus, all 
representatives including all alternate representatives 5  who have met in parliament will 
probably be a bit higher in both countries at the end of the term. Still, since the term is similar 
across countries I regard the data as comparable. I also see it as unlikely that the 
representatives entering parliament later systematically differ from the current parliament 
                                                        
5  Meaning stand-ins; representatives that are not directly elected for parliament, whom replace other 
representatives when they are not able to meet.  
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group. I argue that four periods are sufficient in terms of restricting the amount of time spent 
on data collection and preparation.  
 
4.2.1 Governmental periods and nomination regulations  
 
Since it is parliamentary periods that are studied, the parliamentary groups are results of 
elections and candidate selections.  Thus, the results and features of the electoral systems in 
each country should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results. Federal 
(Bundestag) and national (Storting) elections are held every fourth year in Germany and 
Norway. During the periods studied in this thesis SPD was a cabinet party in the second 
(1976-1980) and the fourth period (2013-) (Lees 2005:202–203). Ap was able to enter the 
governmental offices during the first (1957-1961), second (1977-1981) and fourth period 
(2013-) studied (Nyhamar 1990; Bergh 1987; Narud et al. 2014). As noted previously, Ap 
was the largest party also in the 1997 election but due to Jagland’s 36,9 per cent threshold 
(which was not met) a centre minority Government was established. However, in 2001 the 
centrist Government had to go due to a lost confidence vote and Jens Stoltenberg (Ap) 
became Prime Minister. Compared, Ap have been more represented in government than SPD, 
however, both parties have had influential roles in their countries’ political development. The 
fact that both parties are candidates for government is undeniably a factor that can have some 
kind of influence on the pool of representatives. Moreover, this underlines why it is important 
to study the parliamentary groups; these are groups close to the party leadership but they are 
also close to the political power centra. They are thus influential actors in democratic 
processes. 
 
The electoral systems and nomination procedures in the two countries are also of relevance 
because the study of party-union ties on the elite parliamentary level is indisputably 
connected to recruitment and nomination of candidates. The regulations and laws that 
condition the nomination and recruitment processes have been kept more or less stable during 
the periods under study. In Norway, there are direct elections and proportional representation 
and the parties provide candidate lists. These procedures are “closed” in the sense that only a 
handful of party members participate in the process (Hanne Marthe Narud 2008:553). It can 
be argued that in Norway the voters more or less vote for parties, not specific candidates. The 
Norwegian election law determine how mandates are divided between the counties. However, 
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it does not regulate special quotas for women or other groups. This is decided within the 
party. Ap have a women’s quota that is meant to secure gender balance (Allern, Karlsen, and 
Narud 2014:5). Germany has a combination of first-past-the-post and proportional 
representation, there are thus two roads to the parliamentary stage. According to Roberts 
(1988:98), federal party statutes only provide broad guidelines for selection procedures. 
Thus, the Länder party organization provide more detailed rules. The parties do not tend to 
have strict eligibility requirements. The exception is gender quotas. Since 1987 the German 
SPD took up quota nominations for women (Best and Cotta 2000:177). There is thus no 
noteworthy difference in formal regulations that might affect the nomination of candidates or 
favour candidates with trade union background. However, the first-past-the-post system is 
known for favouring men (Best and Cotta 2000:147). This might be a factor in Germany. 
Still, it is not an independent variable that is possible to control for in this study, it is rather a 
factor to be aware of.  
 
4.3 Method and data 
 
The data utilized in this thesis is a combination of already existing data and completely new 
data collected. Accordingly there are multiple choices and procedures that will be reviewed 
in this section. The data in both countries are mainly based on biographical documents. 
However, since the data from each country have been gathered differently, I will outline each 
process separately. At the end of the chapter I will discuss the comparability of the data, as 
well as give an assessment of the main challenges that follows the design, method and data.  
 
4.3.1 Sources 
 
In order to trace the parliament representatives’ positions in DGB and LO unions, it has been 
necessary to access each representative’s biographies and CVs. In the Norwegian case, the 
information was obtained from a complete data set (NSD, Politikerarkivet 1945-d.d 2013). In 
the German case I have used biography handbooks: Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder 
des Deutschen Bundestages 1949–2002, as well as the German Bundestags archives 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2015; Deutscher Bundestag 2007). To increase the reliability, the 
information about the newest German representatives is also checked and supplemented by 
information from the politicians own web pages. The data comprises all SPD and Ap 
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parliamentarians from the four selected parliamentary periods, including politicians sitting 
longer or shorter terms (alternates). Staff, meaning those who have full-time official 
positions, are also included.  
 
The main source for the German data (Vierhaus and Herbst 2002) comprises biographies of 
Bundestag members between 1949 and 1994. The handbook includes three volumes and was 
published in 2002 by K.G Saur. The editors are two German historians: Rudolf Vierhaus and 
Ludolf Herbst. The biographies cover political activity in industry and business, in school and 
religious services and in associations and political parties. There is some uncertainty related 
to the consistency of the mapping of DGP connections as well as the main behind the 
biographies. The biographies appear to be based on documents from different archives such 
as the FES (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), but the information provided varies a great deal, 
mostly in terms of sources documented. I have made several efforts to get in touch with the 
authors, but unfortunately, this has been unsuccessful. Still, because occupation, organisation 
activity and associations appear to be documented consistently, I regard it as likely that DGB 
official positions are mentioned. And, since it is two historians affiliated to rather well-known 
universities in Germany that have collected the data, and because the renowned K.G Saur 
published the biographies, I regard the documentation to be sufficiently reliable. Still, the 
reliability and consistency in the mapping may be weaker than with the Norwegian data that 
appear as more systematically mapped and updated over a longer period of time.  
 
The main data sources in Norway is the NSD Archive of Politicians from 1945 up until today 
and the data set Norwegian Parliamentarians (NSD, Politikerarkivet 1945-d.d 2013). These 
archives are collections of biographical information about members of parliament. Professor 
Trond Nordby undertook the first major contribution to the archive in 1985. The so-called 
Biografiverket formed the basis of the old NSD biography archive for the period after 1945. 
The collection was also based on previously written biographies by Olaf Chr. Torp, which 
gives an overview of new parliaments. Moreover, to register key positions and organisational 
activity, various publications about institutions and organizations were used. In addition, oral 
and written inquiries towards the biography authors and representatives were used (NSD, 
Politikerarkivet 1945-d.d 2013). The biographies were updated in 2001 by a survey and most 
of the information was standardized. The 2001 questionnaire was sent to all those who had 
been in Parliament or government after 1985 and to representatives who had been in 
Parliament or in government before 1985 and who were still alive in 1985. 88 per cent 
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responded to the survey, and the questions were mostly answered with accurate and detailed 
information. The parliamentary politician data set is mainly based on data from the Politician 
archives and supplemented by data from Statistics Norway (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, SSB). The 
data set is used to extract parliamentary politicians from Ap in the relevant periods. Since the 
Norwegian Data Service has collected the data over several years, and since it has been 
supplemented and improved over a longer period of time, I regard the data as reliable. In the 
following sections I will review the operationalization of the variable and the framework that 
will be used to assess the strength of the ties.  
 
4.3.2 Operationalizations 
 
In this thesis the personnel overlaps and transfers between SPD and DGB, and between Ap 
and LO, are studied. Specifically, personnel ties is operationalized as members of parliament 
(MPs) who hold or have held an official position in a LO or DGB union. The MP alternates 
are included, as far as possible, in the data set. This might enable a distinction between the 
list candidates on top of the lists and the alternates further down. It also increases the N, 
which strengthens the validity of the findings. All kinds of staff are not systematically 
included in the data. However, MPs with full-time positions such as manager or advisor are 
included6. Personal overlaps refer to SPD or Ap MPs who have official position in a DGB or 
LO union while in parliament. Transfers refer to SPD or Ap politicians with a seat in 
parliament who have had an official position in DGB, LO or affiliated unions, prior to their 
election to parliament. Official positions include positions on both the lower and national 
union levels. In the Norwegian NSD-data, the type of positions is not categorized because 
there are many variations in the positions. Thus, the definition is somewhat dependent on 
interpretation. However, I will argue that the criteria applied in both data sets can be 
summarized as: official positions meaning a position where the representative has a central 
role and tasks that go beyond mere membership or volunteer activity. Because there are few 
studies and limited data, the approach and definition is somewhat flexible and exploratory. 
Official positions ranges from president, board members, executive, managers, honorary 
member and Chair or Head of different committees and boards. This flexible approach allows 
me to extract as much information as possible. I argue that in an initial mapping, such as this 
one, is this the best approach. Later on there will be a review of the search words that were 
                                                        
6 This differ from the studies of Heidar and Allern in Sundberg (2001), where all staff is included. 
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used when analysing the documents. This will give a more precise description of which top 
positions that where mapped in each country.  
 
As noted in section 3.5 in the previous chapter I will make a distinction between overlaps and 
transfers. Overlaps capture the representatives who have an official union position while 
holding a parliamentary seat. Transfers include all representatives who hold or have held an 
official union position prior or during their parliamentary term. The distinction between 
transfer and overlap is only possible if the years (start and end) of the positions are disclosed. 
This has not been straightforward, and it will be discussed further in the chapter, section 
4.6.1. 
 
Other variables relevant for this study are the other unorganized kinds of ties defined in the 
previous chapter; overlapping organisational structures, inter-organisational ties for contact 
and other unorganized links for contact. However, these will not be included in the main 
analysis but rather discussed and compared to the findings, in chapter 6. The focus will be on 
main trends found in secondary literature. To make any kind of comparisons it is necessary to 
define strong and weak ties. In the next section, I will present the framework for evaluating 
how strong or weak the ties are. 
 
4.3.3 Framework: strong, medium or weak ties 
 
To assess the strength of the ties mapped, the number of MPs who hold or have held an 
official position in a union will be counted. The frequencies of such transfers or overlaps 
determine the strength of the tie. I will use the framework from Allern (2010:73) to 
differentiate between three categories of strength. The three categories are as follows:  
 Weak: less than 10 per cent 
 Medium: 10-20 per cent 
 Strong: more than 20 per cent.  
 
This constitutes the main framework for analyzing the strength of the personnel ties. It is by 
no means expected that it will describe the strength of the ties perfectly, nor that the 
categories give the best estimates of the strength of the ties. However, these categories have 
been used by other scholars and have given sufficient estimates (Allern 2010). A direct 
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comparison between strong personnel ties and more organized ties, for instance frequency of 
meetings or seminars, will not be part of this thesis. It is beyond the scope of this thesis, thus 
general trends will be compared between different ties.  
 
The strength of the personnel ties mapped will be compared over time, and between Norway 
and Germany. The latter comparison may be associated with some equivalence challenges. 
The percentage thresholds that have been used in Norway may not be as suitable for 
Germany, a much bigger country known for extensive unorganized ties on the individual 
level. It is also important to note that these categories should be seen in accordance with other 
such ties, to other interest groups. If a 20 per cent overlap is common between the 
parliamentary bodies and all kinds of organizations in Germany, one might define strong ties 
as over 30 per cent. However, since this is a somewhat exploratory mapping I consider the 
framework to be a suitable starting point that can be discussed further in accordance with the 
findings in each country. These discussions will hopefully give ground for improvements of 
the framework, but for now this underlines the importance of conducting this study.  
 
4.3.4 Data collection 
 
Germany 
The collection of the German data has been somewhat challenging. After months of research 
and outreach I was not able to access or find any systematized data or complete data sets 
containing CVs or biographies. However, I found the biographical handbooks and the 
biographies online (Vierhaus and Herbst 2002; Deutscher Bundestag 2015; Deutscher 
Bundestag 2007), which has made it possible to make a new data set especially for this 
analysis. The fact that no such data exist emphasizes the need for empirical evidence. I will 
now go through the data collecting process before I discuss the challenges that surfaced 
during this process.  
 
First, it was necessary to comprise a list over the parliamentarians from the selected periods. 
In the Bundestag archives, I was able to collect a list over all parliamentarians in the 
Bundestag from 1949-1994 (Deutschen Bundestag 1998). I had to extract the names of SPD- 
parliamentarians from the relevant periods and enlist them in an excel sheet. To strengthen 
the reliability, I went through the lists three times. The names from the two most recent 
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periods was available online at Bundestag’s own archive pages 7 . The lists also include 
representatives who did not sit full periods – alternates. However, I was not able to 
distinguish these systematically. Next, I was able to find the biographical handbooks at the 
Freie University Librabry in Berlin and scan all the relevant SPD-biographies before bringing 
them back to Norway. The scanned material was double-checked with the lists prior to 
departure.  
 
The next step in the process was to obtain the relevant information from the biographies. To 
find this information I converted the scanned pictures to simple text in google docs and did 
optical character recognition. I did word search on a selected number of relevant words and 
abbreviations. Unfortunately, the Google docs program reading the scanned documents could 
not interpret all the text. About 50 per cent of the scanned documents had to be read and 
searched manually. I used the same search words and read through the documents manually 
to highlight the search words and relevant information 8. I also had my work double-checked 
by a fellow student. The search words selected represent the words that are mainly used when 
referring to trade unions in the German language, the umbrella word being Gewerkschaft. 
The reason for using search words is that it would be too time consuming to read through 
over 800 biographies, page-by-page. Since the biographies are in German the translation 
process has also been time consuming. By using specific search words I only needed to 
translate and code the search word-hits. However, this method might cause some of the 
representatives, who belong to small trade unions, with names not included in the search 
words, to be missing. Still, since the same search words is used on all biographies the 
possible errors will be more or less systematic during all periods.  
 
The advantage of using search words is that it eases replication. This again strengthens 
reliability. It is also less time consuming, and a more systematic approach than reading 
randomly through all 800 biographies. The search words are a filtering-process that makes it 
easier to focus on the representatives who have a connection with the trade union. Based on 
the hits of the word search, I read through all the relevant biographies and translated the 
relevant parts from German to English. Since my German level is between A2- B1 the 
translation have been checked and revised by a German fellow student. Based on these 
                                                        
7 (Deutscher Bundestag 2007; Deutscher Bundestag 2015) 
8 The search words and explanations can be found in the code manual 
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translations, I gave every representative a unique ID-number and coded the relevant 
information. I will describe this process in more detail later in the chapter.  
 
Norway 
The Norwegian data has already been gathered and systemized in two separate NSD data sets 
(NSD, Politikerarkivet 1945-d.d 2013). The data about parliamentary representatives 
(Stortingspolitikere) is used to extract the Ap- politicians from the four periods selected. 
These data are combined through the personal id with the Politician archives 
(Politikerarkivet), which includes information about the parliamentarians’ official positions 
and affiliation with organisations. The data covers information about positions in roughly 
1000 organizations. To include most representatives with background from LO or other LO-
unions I have selected Norwegian search words that cover the different unions under LO or 
LO itself. This is done mostly to capture as much relevant data as possible and to make the 
process more or less similar with the German data collecting process. The search words used 
are Landsorganisasjonen, LO which is the name and abbreviation for the main trade union 
organisation that is studied in this thesis. Since there are many Norwegian words referring to 
unions, I have also searched for all 24 unions listed under LO 9. Because several of the unions 
have changed name or merged during the last decades I have also used the search words 
fagforening, which means trade union and forbund, which means federation, to cover all 
kinds of LO-affiliation. I have not included unions that are not part of LO. This is due to the 
scope of the thesis. Other distinctions are level; national, lower levels or international level; 
position and start and end year of position. The Norwegian data distinguishes between the 
elected representatives and the alternate representatives. Thus, I will do two analyses, one 
including only the directly elected, and one including all representatives in the data set from 
NSD. The latter is thus comparable with the German data and includes alternate 
representatives. If the two analyses with different N show similar trends this will strengthen 
the reliability of the findings.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9 Many of the unions have merged and thus the old names of the unions are included in the data set rather than 
the new name. After some research on the unions web pages I have included the names of the unions before 
they merged. This is however only the unions that had no word hit on the main union name. List of all unions 
can be found in the appendix. 
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4.3.5 Coding and final data sets 
 
Based on the word search all relevant representatives have been extracted, documented and 
coded. In sum, I found 413 representatives with some sort of trade union association among 
862 parliamentarians in Germany. In Norway there were 340 Ap-representatives during these 
periods, 68 had a trade union connection. The representatives’ connection in both countries 
has been coded similarly10. I have also coded transfer and overlaps as two different variables 
(see code manual).  
 
In the Norwegian data, level is already included from the NSD data sets. I have, as far as 
possible, coded the union-level in the German data as well. State, district and local levels are 
all included in the lower level category, while national level and international level are coded 
separately11. This coding is used by NSD on the Norwegian data and thus I have coded it 
similar in the German data. The threshold in the German data is thus between federal and 
state level. Information is lost between the state and lower levels in Germany. However, 
because the information about actual level is somewhat scarce and the differentiation would 
require a lot of geographical research, I have chosen to keep it similar to the Norwegian data. 
Moreover, in this thesis I - first and foremost - seek to study the national level. 
Differentiation is thus necessary12. Because of the lack of accurate information, especially in 
the German data, I have chosen to not code full-time positions, but there are undeniably 
several official positions that are full-time.  
 
4.3.6 Challenges 
 
There have been several challenges when collecting and coding data. In the next section I 
will give a brief report of the main encounters. First of all, the information recorded in the 
German biographies is inconsistent. Some biographies are very extensive and detailed while 
others include only occupation and main parliamentary activity. I have done Internet searches 
on the representatives who have very short bios, to check if there is any mentioning of trade 
union connection. It seems as if official positions in trade unions are reported consistently in 
                                                        
10 See code manual for detailed coding 
11 Coded similar to the Norwegian data. For more information see code manual 
12 Youth groups are not included as a separate value, because it is part of the organisation as a whole and thus 
coded regularly. 
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the data. The process of coding the relevant SPD representatives was somewhat challenging 
because some of the reported activity falls into a blurry category “more than membership” 
which is difficult to entangle. Overall, the parliamentarians working for a union or as a union 
official seems to be referred to as Gewerkschaftsfunktionär in the biographies from the two 
first election periods (1,2), and as Gewerkschaftsekkretär in the biographies from the two last 
periods (3,4). The consistent use of these titles strengthens reliability of the data and have 
made the coding less dependent on subjective assessments.  
 
The distinction between transfer and overlap is only feasible if the start and end years for the 
positions are disclosed. This information is unfortunately inconsistently disclosed in the data 
especially in the German data. Thus, a revision of the initial plan has been necessary. As 
noted, I have tried to code transfer and overlap as different variables. I have decided to place 
all people that hold or have held positions in the trade unions in the transfer category. It is 
difficult to know if the representative went directly from a high position in the DGB to the 
parliament, thus transfer is interpreted as hold or have held an official position at one point in 
time prior or during their parliamentary period. Overlaps are more narrowly coded. Only 
representatives with a documented official position in a union while being MPs are coded as 
1. Thus, there are many uncertain values (coded as 9) and the results should thus be 
interpreted with caution. In the Norwegian data there is more accurate information about start 
and end years for the official position. I have included a transfer variable that is stricter. It 
differentiates between those who went directly from an official union position to parliament, 
and those who have years in-between the union and parliamentary positions13. 
 
This revision and coding have resulted in two complete data sets where transfer is the main 
variable. The variable documents whether a representative hold or have held a high trade 
union position. In addition there are variables giving information about the level and kind of 
connection. Throughout this data collection and coding process I have tried to double-check 
everything, either with help from fellow students and helpers, or myself. This has 
strengthened the reliability.  
 
 
 
                                                        
13 A direct transfer entails no years in-between, for example official position in LO in 1956 and elected for 
parliament in 1957. 
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4.3.7 Comparison 
 
The German data is processed and checked fewer times than the Norwegian NSD-data. The 
German data is also scarcer and seems less consistent than the Norwegian data, which makes 
a direct comparison challenging. Still, I argue that the data is comparable first, because the 
first-hand data in each country is based on biographical material, and, second, because the 
time periods, unit of analysis (parliamentary group) and search words are very similar. I have 
coded the data based on standardized coding principles. Thus, the coding is less reliant on 
subjective assessments. Accordingly, I expect the selection bias to be fairly similar across 
cases. The biggest worry is the possible underreporting in the German data. This calls for a 
cautious eye when interpreting the results. Thus, I will focus on more general trends rather 
than absolute numbers or percentages close to the strength thresholds, as described in section 
4.3.3. 
 
Caution must also be taken due to the differences in N. It is possible to execute two analyses 
with different N in the Norwegian data; one including the directly elected (actual mandates) 
and one including all representatives (including alternates). The results from the latter will be 
compared with the German data because these data has only one N, including all alternate 
representatives. Still, these numbers may not be as reliable as expected either. For instance, in 
the second parliamentary period there were 214 SPD representatives elected directly to the 
Bundestag. In the data set based on the DGB-lists there are only 215 representatives, which 
indicate that only one alternate representative met over the four-year period. This seems very 
unlikely and thus the total N is probably higher. After checking the lists several times, I could 
not extract additional names and thus there seems to be a reliability problem with the total N 
in the German data, at least from the first two periods where lists over all parliamentarians 
were used. However, I will argue that it is not likely that the representatives not included in 
the lists differ systematically from the representatives studied. One last remark regarding the 
country differences are that union-levels in Norway and Germany is quite different, at least at 
the lower levels. As noted earlier, the levels in Germany are of a grander scale. The state 
level should probably not be seen as equivalent to regional levels in Norway. However, in the 
coding it is not differentiated between state, district or local levels, only between national 
level and everything lower. Still, I regard the national level in the two countries as close to 
equivalent, and thus I have chosen to separate this level with lower levels.  
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4.4 Summary 
 
This study is a comparative case study where the unit of analysis is the parliamentary groups 
of the Norwegian Ap and German SPD. To answer the research questions I have collected 
and coded data from four parliamentary periods in each country, starting in 1957 and ending 
with the current period, 2013-2017. Based on the final data sets I seek to map the frequency 
and level of overlaps and transfers, and examine these findings in accordance with the set of 
expectations defined in chapter three. The data is mainly based on biographies and have been 
coded with as similar procedures as possible. The main disadvantage is that the collecting 
process of these data has been somewhat different. This might imply that there are some 
issues related to reliability and equivalence. The challenge is that the consistency in the data 
from Germany is unknown. However, the data that actually exists has given enough 
information to create a data set that comprise information about parliamentary representatives 
and their connection to trade unions. The key information and processes presented in this 
chapter is summarized in table 2 below.  
 
Table 2. Overview of variables, data, search words and time periods. 
Country Variables Data Search words  Time periods 
Norway Personnel ties: 
MPs who hold 
or have held an 
official position 
in a LO-union 
or LO 
Parliamentarian 
biographies, NSD data set: 
Politikerarkivet 
Stortingspolitikere 
Landsorganisasjonen i 
Norge, LO, 
fagforening, forbund, 
24 unions under LO* 
  
1957-1961 
1977-1981 
1997-2001 
2013-2017 
 
Germany Personnel ties: 
MPs who hold 
or have held an 
official position 
in a DGB-union 
or DGB 
Parliamentarian 
biographies. 
Biographisches Handbuch 
der Mitglieder des 
Deutschen Bundestages 
1949–2002, 1949–2002.  
German Bundestags 
Archives 
Gewerkschaft, 
Deutsche 
Gewerkschaftsbundes, 
DGB, 
Industriegewerkschaft 
IG,  
1957-1961 
1976-1980 
1994-1998 
2013- 2017 
* Name of all 24 unions is included in the appendix 
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5 Empirical analyses 
 
The development of personnel ties will be mapped in two stages. First, I will present the 
development of personnel ties in each country. Second, I will compare the personnel ties in 
Norway and Germany. Each section is divided by country, type of tie (transfer or overlaps) 
and level. As noted, transfer is used in a broad sense; the representative had an official 
position in a union at one point in time prior or during their parliamentary term. Based on the 
percentages, I will assess the strength of the ties from each period in accordance with the 
framework presented in chapter four. Over 20 per cent is considered to be strong ties, 
between 10 and 20 per cent is medium strong, and less than 10 per cent is regarded as weak. 
Finally, I will compare the personnel ties between the two countries and discuss the findings 
in light of the expectations outlined in chapter three.  
 
5.1 Personnel ties over time: Germany 
 
In the next section I will present the percentage and absolute numbers of parliamentary 
representatives who hold or have held an official position in DGB or a DGB union.  
 
 
Figure 2. Share of the SPD parliamentary group that hold or have held an official position in 
a DGB-union or DGB. 
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As seen in figure 2, the data set from the first parliamentary period (1957-1961) contains 187 
representatives from SPD. Among these, 27 per cent (50) of the social democratic 
parliamentary group hold or have held an official position in a DGB-union prior or during 
their parliamentary period. According to the framework of strength this constitutes a strong 
personnel tie. During the second parliamentary period from 1976-1980, the data set includes 
215 representatives.  Among these 18 per cent (39) hold or have held an official position in 
DGB or a DGB-union. In accordance with the framework, this falls into the category between 
10 and 20 per cent, meaning that the personnel ties were of medium strength. In the third 
period there are 262 representatives, 12 per cent (31) of these hold or have held an official 
position in a DGB-union. Hence, the period can be categorized as showing medium strength 
ties between SPD and DGB. During the fourth and current period (2013-2017) there are 198 
SPD- representatives, among these 8 per cent (16) hold or have held an official position in a 
DGB-union. In accordance with the framework, this is a weak personnel tie. The percentages 
presented are mostly close to the thresholds and thus caution must be taken when interpreting 
these results. 
 
As noted, the documentation of overlaps of official positions is inconsistent in the German 
data. Hence, the numbers should be interpreted with caution14. Still, the numbers collected 
may help outline how the personnel ties are materialized. In the first period there are 5.4 per 
cent (10) who hold an official position in a DGB-union during their parliamentary period. 
The second period marks a decline, and only 1.9 per cent (4) holds an official position in a 
DGB-union during their parliamentary period. During the third period this number declines 
even more to 0.8 per cent (2). And during the last period there are no overlaps. These 
numbers show that there are more transfers than overlaps among the German representatives. 
The findings also support the claim of an overall decline, however the explanation might just 
as well be that it is a result of incomplete documentation. 
 
                                                        
14 Not documented/missing: see appendix. 
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Figure 3. Development in share of representatives from the national union level and lower 
levels in DGB or a DGB-union.  
* International and missing level excluded, see appendix 
 
The documentation of union level is more consistent in the German data. Figure 3 shows that 
during the first period, 56 per cent (28) of the representatives hold or have held official 
positions at a lower union level, while 24 per cent (12) of the representatives were associated 
with positions at the national level15. Only one representative came from a position at the 
international level. During the second period, from 1976-1980, 64 per cent (25) of the 
representatives’ official positions were at a lower level, while 28 per cent (11) were at the 
national level, none had an international affiliation. In the third period, from 1994-1998, 65 
per cent (20) of the representatives were associated with an official position at a lower union 
level, while 26 per cent (8) were connected to the national level, and only one transferred 
from an international branch. During the last and current period, starting in 2013, 75 per cent 
(12) of the representatives hold or have held an official union position at a lower union level, 
while 19 per cent (3) were associated to the national level. There were none connected to the 
international level. The main tendency is that there is a greater amount of representatives 
coming from a lower level (state, district, local) than the national level (federal), in Germany.  
 
 
                                                        
15 Missing: see appendix. 
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5.1.1 Gradual weakening of personnel ties 
 
The overall share of representatives who hold or have held an official position in a DGB-
union are declining. At the end of the 1950s the representatives with an official position 
connection amounted for 27 per cent of the parliamentary group. In accordance with the 
framework this constitutes a strong tie. In other words, the party-union contact in terms of 
transfers was frequent. However, during the mid-1970s a decline is apparent. With a 9 per 
cent decrease to 18 per cent, the relationship turned into medium strong. The period during 
the 1990s demonstrated a continuation of the downward trend, but kept relations at a medium 
level. In the current parliamentary period the ties have become weak, but they are still 
existent. When 8 per cent of the parliamentary group hold or have held an official position in 
a DGB-union, it is not a weakening in terms of a complete divorce, but rather a separation. 
The representatives are mostly connected to the lower union level, which is not unexpected 
since Germany is a federal state, where the state levels are of great importance. In sum, the 
findings from Germany support the expectation about strong personnel ties during the 1950s, 
as well as the expectation about a decline in these ties from the 1950s till today. The next 
question is thus how this trend is compared to similar ties in Norway.  
 
5.2 Personnel ties over time: Norway 
 
In the Norwegian data there is more accurate information about which year each 
representative hold or have held an official position in a LO or a LO-union. It is also possible 
to distinguish between the elected representatives and the alternate representatives, who are 
“stand-ins” for longer or shorter periods. Thus, there is one number for the directly elected 
and one number for all representatives who met in parliament during the period. In the 
following review of the results, I will first present the data, including the alternates (similar to 
the German data and presentation), then I will review the results of the parliamentary group 
without alternates. This is also illustrated in two separate figures (4,5). Finally, overlaps, 
direct transfer and level will be presented.  
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Figure 4. Share of Ap parliamentary group (including alternates) who hold or have held an 
official position in LO-union 
*No missing or international level 
 
In the first period, from 1957-1961, the data set including alternate representatives contains 
127 representatives. Among these 16 per cent (20) hold or have held an official position in 
LO or a LO-union. This is a medium strong tie in accordance with the framework. During the 
second period the data set contains 134 representatives, 13 per cent (17) of these 
representatives hold or have held an official position in LO or a LO-union. The ties have 
declined, but are still within the medium category. In the third parliamentary period from 
1997-2001, there are 118 representatives including alternates, among these 20 per cent (24) 
hold or have held an official position in a LO-union. It marks a significant upsurge from 13 to 
20 per cent. The fourth and current period starting in 2013 there are 167 representatives 
including the alternates and only 1.2 per cent (2) representatives who hold or have held an 
official position in a LO-union. This marks a striking decline from 20 per cent to 1.2 per cent 
and can be categorized as a weak tie. 
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Figure 5. Share of Ap parliamentary group (excluding alternates) who hold or have held an 
official position in LO-union 
 
By separating the alternate representatives from the representatives directly elected to 
parliament it is possible to differentiate between those on top of the party’s candidate lists 
and those further down. This makes an interesting distinction that can reveal more about the 
variation among the representatives and further about the overall trends. As figure 5 show, 
there are 78 Ap members elected directly to parliament among these 21 per cent (16) hold or 
have held an official position in LO or a LO-union. In accordance with the framework this is 
a strong tie, and thus during the first period the two groups differ in terms of strength of the 
tie. During the second parliamentary period there were 76 Ap representatives elected directly 
to parliament, among these 16 per cent (12) hold or have held an official position in LO or a 
LO-union. Thus, the percentages are still somewhat different from the group including 
alternate representatives, but both ties are categorized as medium and both ties show decline. 
In the third period there are 65 Ap-representatives elected directly to parliament and among 
these 31 per cent (20) hold or have held an official position in LO or a LO-union. This is an 
evident increase, coherent with the increase in the group including alternates. Thus, the trend 
continues to be similar, in terms of direction, over time. During the current parliamentary 
period 55 representatives were elected directly to parliament, among these 4 per cent (2) hold 
or have held an official position in LO or a LO-union. This is also in line with the significant 
decline evident in the ties where alternate representatives are included.   
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The next step is to examine how many of the representatives had overlapping positions or 
transferred directly from a union position. During the first period there were 6.3 per cent (8) 
in the group including the alternate representatives who had an overlapping LO-position 
while in parliament. There were 6.4 per cent (5) overlaps among the representatives who 
were elected directly to parliament. During the second period there were 2.2 per cent (3) in 
the group including the alternate representatives who had an overlapping LO-position, 1.3 per 
cent (1) of these overlaps were among the representatives elected directly for parliament. The 
third period had only 1.5 per cent (1) representatives who overlapped and this representative 
was elected directly for parliament. During the last period there were no overlaps.  
 
There are few direct transfers and thus I will only summarize these results in absolute 
numbers. During the first parliamentary period there was only 1 representative who went 
directly from an official position in a LO-union to the parliament. However, this person was 
an alternate and thus there is possibly no direct transfer after all because there is no 
information about when the alternate were actually in parliament. During the third period 
there were three direct transfers and two of them were representatives directly elected. They 
went directly from an official position in a LO-union to the parliamentary seat. The third 
period have two representatives that went directly from an official position in LO or a LO-
union to a parliamentary seat. Finally, one of the representatives during the current period 
went directly from an official position in a LO-union to the parliamentary seat. In sum, there 
are very few overlaps and direct transfers, and in accordance with the German findings most 
ties are regular transfers where the representatives have had an official union position at one 
point in time prior to gaining their parliamentary seat.  
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Figure 7. Development in share of representatives from the national union level and lower 
levels in LO or a LO-union from 1957-2017. 
 
As seen in figure 7, during the first parliamentary period (1957-1960) there are 25 per cent 
(5) of the representatives who hold or have held an official position at a lower union level and 
75 per cent (15) of the representatives who hold or have held a high position at the national 
union level. Among all the representatives from the second period (1977-1981) there are 47 
per cent (8) of the representatives associated to a lower union level and 53 per cent (9) of the 
representatives with an official position at the national union-level. The third period (1997-
2001) include 42 per cent (10) of the representatives who hold or have held an official 
position at a lower union level and 58 per cent (14) of the representatives connected to the 
national union level. During the current period (2013) both (100 per cent) representatives 
have held a position at the national union level. There are no representatives associated to 
international levels.  
 
5.2.1 Decline, but not linear 
 
Since 1957, there is an evident decline in the share of representatives who hold or have held 
an official position in LO or a LO-union. However, the trend is not as consistent as in 
Germany. The ties were fairly strong during the first period when 16 per cent of all 
parliamentary representatives were tied to Lo or a LO-union through current or previous 
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official positions. When separating the alternate representatives, the percentage increases to 
around 20. This indicates strong ties. In the second period there is an apparent decline in the 
share of representatives with such connections and in accordance to the framework the tie is 
of medium strength. This is by no means an extreme decline in terms of percentages, but the 
share in both groups is declining. During the third period the ties are stronger than ever. 20 
per cent of the group including alternate representatives hold or have held an official union 
position. Strikingly, 31 per cent of the group elected directly to parliament has such trade 
union connections. This marks the strongest tie mapped (31 per cent), while the next 
parliamentary period studied marks the weakest tie, with only 1.2 percent and 4 per cent of 
the representatives who hold or have held an official union position. This is a dramatic 
decline with many possible explanations. It might be due to special events, or rather be part 
of a trend towards a complete separation. Still, the finding should be seen in relation to the 
third period. The drop may be dramatic because the tie during the third period was 
exceptionally strong. Thus, it might be explained by special circumstances during the third 
period. Moreover, the third period might be an outlier deviating from the declining trend. 
Either way, the variation between the two latter periods calls for further discussions in 
chapter six.  
 
Another interesting finding is the difference between the groups including alternate 
representatives and the groups with only directly elected MPs. The first period marks a 
difference, in the strength of the ties. If the alternates are included the tie is of medium 
strength (16 per cent). When removing the alternates, the tie can be characterized as strong 
(20 per cent). Still, 20 per cent is on the threshold between the two categories and thus this 
might not be as significant divide. However, the difference is also evident during the third 
period; the share of parliamentary candidates elected directly to the Storting with LO-
background is 31 per cent, while the share including alternates is 20 per cent. The tie is thus 
stronger when the alternates are removed. This is an evident trend during the other periods as 
well. The higher the position on the party list, the higher the share of representatives with 
trade union background. In other words, the more top list candidates the more trade union 
background. Or, with a trade union background it is more likely that the candidates are placed 
high on the candidate lists. This implies that trade union background may be an important 
selection criterion when the party is putting together the nomination lists.  
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The findings from Norway are somewhat challenging to interpret considering the expectation 
of a decline. The personnel ties studied have weakened since the 1957, however, the 
weakening might have started much later than the 1950s. The most significant decline 
happened after 2001 and the third period. Thus, the ties have changed since the 1950s, but the 
change is not linear. For instance, if the last period had been 1997-2001, the development 
would imply realignment rather than separation. Still, the overall trend show a decline. 
 
Regarding the union level of the connection, the trend is generally stable in Norway. The 
amount of representatives that hold or have held a high position at the national union-level is 
mostly higher than the lower union levels. In terms of overlaps the Norwegian data show a 
decline. Yet, there are very few representatives with overlapping positions and this implies 
that there are generally more transfers than overlaps. Direct transfers are extremely seldom 
and thus difficult to interpret further.  
 
5.3 Comparison of ties in Norway and Germany 
 
In this section I will compare the personnel ties in Norway and Germany. The comparison 
will be based on developments over time. The comparison will be structured in accordance 
with the expectations outlined in chapter three.   
 
5.3.1 Decline in different paces  
 
 
Figure 8. Development in personnel ties in Norway and Germany from 1957-2017 
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The personnel ties studied in Germany were strong during the first parliamentary period. 27 
per cent of the representatives in parliament had an official position in a DGB-union prior or 
during their parliamentary term. Thus, the ties can be characterized as strong. Compared, the 
personnel ties in Norway were medium strong during the first period, with 16 per cent of the 
parliamentary group having a trade union association. This partly supports the first 
expectation (E1) that the personnel ties were strong during the first period. However, the ties 
were stronger in Germany than in Norway, which supports the third expectation (E3) about 
the German ties being stronger. The next question is if this continued throughout all four 
periods.  
 
Figure 8 show that the development from the 1950s till the 1970s is quite similar in the two 
countries. The percentage of the parliamentary groups that hold or have held an official union 
position declined to 18 per cent in Germany and 13 per cent in Norway. There is thus a 5 per 
cent difference between the two countries during this period. Still, there is a 9 per cent 
decrease in Germany, which is three times as big as the 3 per cent decline in Norway. So far, 
the development is in accordance with the second expectation of a decline. However, during 
the third period the Ap-LO personnel ties had an upsurge. 20 per cent of the Ap 
parliamentary group had an official position in LO prior or during their parliamentary term. 
Even though this is on the strong-medium threshold, the equivalent share is 31 per cent in the 
directly elected parliamentary group and thus it might suggest that the general tie could be 
described as strong. The upsurge found in Norway contradicts the expectation of a decline, it 
rather implies the start of realignment. Compared, the tie in Germany continues downward, at 
steady pace. During the same period, the SPD-DGB tie is within the medium category of 
strength with 12 per cent. This is 8 per cent less than the unorganized tie mapped in Norway, 
and marks a divide between the two countries. Thus, during the third period the tie is stronger 
in Norway than in Germany. This contradicts the third expectation that the personnel ties in 
Germany are consistently stronger than the ties in Norway.  
 
The last period marks another shift. Almost a complete divorce is evident between Ap and 
LO. Only 1.2 percent of the parliamentary group hold or have held an official position in a 
LO-union. During the equivalent period in Germany, the ties have also declined and become 
weak. Still, it is only a 4 per cent decline, from 12 to 8 per cent. The shift found in Norway 
provides new empirical support to the expectation that the personnel party-union ties are 
stronger in Germany than in Norway. Still, this is not consistent throughout all four periods. 
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Yet, the overall decline from 1957 till the current period indicates that the development is 
somewhat similar in both countries and there is an evident decline over time in both 
countries, which supports the second expectation (E2) of a decline over time.   
 
The most interesting finding across countries is the upsurge in the Ap-LO ties during the third 
period. This indicates a non-linear variation in Norway. Moreover, since 1957 the personnel 
ties have declined more gradually in Germany than in Norway. The ties in Germany are thus 
more consistent, but not consistently stronger in all periods - as expected. Nonetheless, from 
1957 to 2013 the Ap-LO unorganized relationship has taken the toughest hit, with currently 
only 1.2 per cent of the parliamentary group that have or had an official union position.  
Thus, this prevails a declining trend in Norway – reflected in the decreasing percentages and 
thresholds in the framework. However, the lack of consistency in this downward trend urges 
further discussions and comparisons.  
 
5.3.2 Comparison of levels in Norway and Germany 
 
 
Figure 9. Share of representatives from the national union level and lower union levels in 
Norway and Germany from 1957-2017.  
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As seen in the figure 7, there are also obvious country differences regarding the union level, 
in which the parliamentary representatives are associated16. Summarized, there are 63.5 per 
cent (40) of the representatives in Norway who are associated with the national union level 
and 36.5 per cent (23) are connected to lower union levels. In Germany, 25 per cent (34) of 
the representatives are associated with the national union level and 62.5 per cent (85) are 
linked to lower union levels17. In Norway most representatives hold or have held an official 
position at the national union level, while in Germany, most of the parliamentarians have 
connections to lower union levels. Since it is not possible to extract the state level 
representatives systematically in the German data these results and the comparison should be 
interpreted with caution.  
 
5.4 Summary  
 
In this chapter I have presented the empirical mapping of Ap and SPD parliamentary 
representatives’ who hold or have held an official position in a trade union. The data have 
been analyzed in two different stages and the personnel ties have been assessed in accordance 
with the framework from Allern (2010). In the first analysis the percentage of the 
representatives with a union background was presented and the analysis showed the existence 
of personnel ties, measured as transfers and overlaps. These ties are evident over time in both 
countries. The strength of the ties has declined in both countries and was strongest during the 
1950s in Germany. The current period marks an all time low in both countries, with 
respectively 8 and 1.2 per cent. Thus, there are several similarities in the development of the 
ties in Norway and Germany. Still, the most significant finding is that among the strongest 
personnel ties mapped are the ties between Ap and LO during the third period (1997-2001). 
This deviates from a gradual decline and from the expectation of the strongest ties during the 
1950s. The period might be an outlier that deviates from a declining trend because of special 
events or circumstances. Either way, this is an interesting finding that will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. 
 
The second analysis is a comparison of the trends in Germany and Norway. In sum, there is 
an evident decline in both countries, with a more linear decline in Germany than in Norway. 
                                                        
16 I have excluded all representatives who are associated with the international union level and those who have 
no level documented from the figure.  
17 12.5 per cent (17) missing. 
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Moreover, the main difference between the countries is the pace of the decline. Still, in 
accordance with the expectation, the general development in the two countries prevail that 
the ties in Norway are consistently weaker than the ties in Germany (except the third period 
in Norway). Another interesting finding is that the level of the union association is mostly on 
the lower union-level in Germany, while the majority in Norway is associated to the national 
union level.  
 
At the end of chapter three I outlined some expectations to guide and structure the empirical 
mapping and analysis. In the last section of both analyses the expectations have been 
discussed in accordance with the results of the mapping. The first expectation - that the ties 
were strongest during the 1950s – find support in Germany but not in Norway. The second 
expectation - about an overall decline - finds support in both countries, but in Norway the 
declining trend is not linear. The third expectation - that the personnel ties in Germany are 
consistently stronger than similar ties in Norway - finds some support. The ties in Germany 
are stronger during the 1950s and continue to be until the end of the 1990s when the 
Norwegian ties have an upsurge. However, during the current period the ties in Germany are 
stronger than the ties in Norway. This shows that the decline in Germany is more linear than 
in Norway, but that the overall decline in Norway is more severe with almost a complete 
separation in the last and current period. In total, the share of representatives with a trade 
union background over four periods is almost 12 per cent in Norway and 16 per cent in 
Germany (see appendix). The countries are fairly similar, but the internal dynamics within 
the two countries and between different ties, will be interesting to discuss further. Thus, the 
next chapter include a comparison of the findings of the analyses in this chapter, summarized 
in table 3, and the development of other ties in each country.  
 
Table 3. Comparison of extent and strength of personnel ties in Norway and Germany 
 Norway Germany 
P1: 1957-1961 16% Medium 27% Strong 
P2: 1976/77-1980/81 13% Medium 18% Medium 
P3: 1994/97- 98/2001 20% Strong 12% Medium 
P4: 2013-2017 1.2% Weak 8% Weak 
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6 Comparison and discussion 
 
This thesis includes three stages of comparison. The previous chapter comprised the two first 
stages, comparing the development of personnel ties within each country and between the 
two countries. Moreover, the analyses covered the research questions concerning the extent 
of the ties and whether the strength of the ties has declined. This chapter is the last stage of 
comparison, and in the next chapter I examine if the personnel ties have developed differently 
in the two countries and if the development of the personnel ties is coherent with the 
development of more organized ties. The main part of the chapter is thus a comparison 
between the general trends in all kinds of ties and the development of the personnel ties 
mapped. The last section will include a discussion of the main similarities and differences 
between the countries, aiming to give a better understanding of the party-union relations in 
Norway and Germany. The last section will also include a brief discussion of possible 
implications and explanations of the findings.  
 
6.1 Comparison within case 
 
In the following section the findings concerning the personnel ties from the analyses will be 
compared with other types of ties in each country. I will analyze the ties by period and see if 
there is any coherence or incoherence in the development. This comparison will be based on 
the secondary literature review, historic developments and other documented ties presented in 
chapter 2 and 3, as well as the results of the mapping from the previous chapter. In closing, I 
will discuss the findings in accordance with the research question. As emphasized in chapter 
4, it is the SPD and Ap’s parliamentary groups that are mapped. Thus, the party is the unit of 
analysis aggregated as MPs. This is an important distinction to be aware of, especially when 
comparing with other unorganized ties.  
 
6.1.1 Ap-LO ties compared  
 
During the 1950s a broad set of ties linked Ap and LO together. The connections ranged from 
inter-organizational ties such as joint committees to more ad hoc meetings. This close 
relation is also evident in the personnel ties mapped in this thesis. 16 per cent of Ap’s 
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parliamentary representatives had a LO-union association during the first parliamentary 
period (1957-1961) studied. The second period (1977-1981) shows a declining trend to 13 
per cent. Still, the ties remain within the category medium strong ties during this second 
period. The decline is coherent with the weakening found in the strongest kind of organized 
ties between Ap and LO; collective affiliation. Known as the most organized ties in Norway 
during this period, these ties had a downward turn starting in 1969 when the rule of collective 
affiliation was relaxed (Allern 2010:140). This led many branches to end their affiliation to 
the party, and this separation process continued for two decades. This decline, however, is 
not as evident in the personnel ties, which had an upsurge in 1997 as 20 per cent of the 
parliamentary group had an official position in a LO-union prior to or during their 
parliamentary term. In a way this finding contradicts the historic development of decline in 
the more organized part of the relationship. As noted in chapter 3, during the 1980s the so-
called right-wing wave caused a set-back for the labour movement and internal ideological 
discussions arose (Nyhamar 1990:384–392, 505–510). During this period Ap started to 
cooperate more with other interest groups (Allern 2010:131). The party-union decline 
reached a critical juncture after the 1997 parliamentary election, when Ap’s election result 
did not surpass the 36,9 per cent minimum threshold set by Jagland. After this election flop, 
internal debates about the party-union relationship arose, and it was decided at the 2002 party 
congress to continue the close party-union relationship (Allern 2010:131).  
 
The upsurge in the personnel ties found in the 1997-2001 parliamentary period studied might 
imply that the parliamentarians elected in 1997 who had a union background, influenced the 
decision to continue the close ties. It appears as if there were two different views within Ap 
during this period; one camp supporting close party-union ties and one camp endorsing 
separation. Prior to the 1997-election the separation-camp had the upper hand, while the pro-
camp was strengthened after the election. This was especially evident in 2000, when the 
recommendation to abolish the party statute stating that all party members should be 
members of an LO union was rejected. This rejection could be a consequence of the strong 
trade union elite within the parliamentary group. The 1997 upsurge might strengthen the 
argument that parliamentary groups and representatives have increasing influence. The 
rejection can be seen as coherent with the upsurge found in the personnel ties. In other words, 
many Ap-elites had strong personal ties to LO during this period and this might explain the 
rejection of the deletion of the rule. However, this is a somewhat causal argument explaining 
the development in inter-organizational ties, yet, the high number of union parliamentarians 
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is not directly explained. This underlines that this third period might be an outlier caused by 
specific events that call for further investigations. 
  
Other studies examining several parts of the party organization also find strong personnel ties 
at the beginning of the 2000s. A survey conducted in 2003/2004 also maps the Ap elite’s 
overlaps with and transfers from LO (Allern 2010:139). The results show that more than 20 
per cent of the party’s top elite holds or have held positions in LO. There are very few of 
Ap’s parliamentary representatives that had overlapping official positions in LO’s main 
organs while in parliament, this is coherent with the few overlaps found in this study. When 
Allern (Allern 2010:140) conducted the survey 14 per cent of Ap’s elite were currently 
officials in LO or LO unions locally or nationally. When taking into account elite members 
who were, or had been union staff, the total share of elite members with current (2003/2004) 
or former trade union positions was almost 40 per cent (ibid). A study from 2001 (Allern and 
Heidar 2001:125) of the trade union background of Aps parliamentary group, also show that 
the strongest set of ties is at the end of the 1990s. Thus, strong ties during the third period 
find support in other similar studies.  
 
Allern (2010:140-145) also finds that there were fairly strong inter-organisational ties during 
the 2000s. This is coherent with the upsurge found in the third period in this study, but not as 
evident in the last period studied (2013-2017). Accordingly, the next question is if the 
dramatic decline found in 2013 can be traced in any other kinds of ties. The suspension of the 
practice that the LO-leader chaired the internal election committee in Ap in 2007 might be an 
indication of a decline. Moreover, the suspension could be the first step towards the 
untangling of personnel ties evident in this mapping, but it might also be due to special 
circumstances surrounding the resignation of the leader, Valla. However, as noted in chapter 
3, Valla also chose to publicly criticize the party’s policies when Ap was in government and 
this might have put a strain on the ties and started a separation on the individual level. 
 
The difference between the two latter periods studied may also be related to the fact that it is 
the parliamentary group that is studied, and not the entire party organization. As seen in other 
studies of personnel ties focusing on other parts of the party, the ties were found to be 
extremely strong. For instance, in 2000, 39 per cent of the Ap congress delegates were former 
or current officials in LO or other LO unions (Heidar and Saglie 2002:279). This might imply 
that the ties between the parliamentary group and LO is weaker than personnel ties between 
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other Ap-politicians and LO. One thought is that the politicians who are part of the 
parliamentary groups are very public figures, part of the professionalization referred to in 
chapter 3. This professionalization might also indicate that the parliamentary representatives 
are under the public eye consistently and that having two hats at the same time is more 
problematic for them. In addition, part of the professionalization is that these representatives 
have worked their way up from the party “grassroots” and may thus not have the LO-ties 
through previous work experience. In sum, the personnel tie mapped in the current 
parliamentary period is almost non-existent and the cause is possibly the professionalization 
of politics, which is more evident among the parliamentary representatives than other party 
officials. Another factor is that the few MPs with LO-associations might have great influence. 
The two persons in the Ap parliamentary group who have held official union positions is Dag 
Terje Andersen and Marit Nybakk. Both are renowned Ap-politicians as well as LO- 
officials. For instance, Andersen has also held several ministerial posts and is thus an 
example of a representative close to the executive power – with influence. Nybakk was 
leader/chair of LO Oslo from 1992-1997, while holding a parliamentary seat 18. How much 
LO bias these two have carried into their parliamentary and ministerial seat is difficult to 
determine. Still, it is indisputable that there is some sort of influence and thus the conclusion 
that there is a complete divorce should be taken cautiously. There could be strong ties in 
terms of elite networking and influence still present in Norway. 
 
The overall picture of the party-union ties in Norway is intricate. The decline has been 
evident in all kinds of ties over time, however, secondary literature show that the inter-
organizational ties are still rather strong. It seems as if the personnel ties are the ties in 
Norway that support the catch-all and cartel party theories of a party-union separation. 
Compared to the strong ties found in 1997, the decline in personnel ties is striking and not 
coherent with the consolidation of inter-organisational ties found in other empirical studies 
(Allern 2010:146). However, the finding is somewhat coherent with other findings about 
personnel ties (Allern and Heidar 2001:125). The development in the more organizational ties 
during the beginning of 2000s can be seen in light of the high share of the representatives 
with a union background. It emphasizes how the union background may carry weight and 
influence. In Germany, the same declining trend was expected and evident. However, 
because of the limited mapping and research on these ties in Germany, the finding of a 
                                                        
18 (Stortinget 2008). 
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general decline is interesting, because it implies that the trends over time in Norway and 
Germany are similar, regardless of historic events or size.  
 
6.1.2 SPD-DGB ties compared 
 
There are few empirical studies done on party-union ties in Germany, which limits the 
possibility for comparison between different ties. However, the preliminary findings from 
Allern and Bale (forthcoming) provide interesting newer knowledge about the ties in 
Germany. In addition, the theoretical literature on the party models outlined in chapter 2 are, 
to a great extent, based on the developments in Germany. Both Duverger (1990) and 
Kirchheimer (1966) worked partly inductively when developing their theories, and thus, this 
literature will also be used to supplement the comparison. 
 
The party-union ties in Germany have been less formalized and based on personal rather than 
collective affiliation according to most of the literature about the German ties (Upchurch, 
Taylor, and Mathers 2009:53). The unions in West Germany guarded their autonomy and as 
follows the formal affiliation has never been very apparent. Scholars, such as Duverger, 
described the SPD as a typical mass party, which entails that the overall party-union ties are 
expected to be strong during the 1950s. This aspect of the theory finds support in the 
personnel ties mapped in this study. Moreover, the first parliamentary period studied in this 
thesis stands out as the period with the strongest ties compared to all other periods in 
Germany.  
 
Otto Kirchheimer also based his catch-all theory on empirical studies from Germany (Padgett 
2002:53–54)and thus the introduction of catch all strategies imply an evident separation 
between the SPD and DGB during the 1960s-1970s. This is partly confirmed by the literature 
reviewed in chapter 3; the DGB became a more authoritative institution during the 1970s as 
this was part of the DGB leadership’s strategy, and thus more organized ties were rare during 
this period. This is also evident in the unorganized ties mapped in this study. The period from 
1976-1980 show a decline from very strong to medium strong ties, and this downward trend 
continues through the 1990s until today. However, the more organized ties nuance the picture 
of a decline according to Jacobey and Behrens (2014). Despite disputes over the SPD 
government’s labour market and pension reforms in the early 2000s, unions and the social 
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democrats sustained joint committees, such as the party’s Gewerkschaftsrat. In addition, 
Allern and Bale (forthcoming) find that SPD and DGB have tacit agreements about regular 
meetings. Together with the Gewerkschaftsrat this seems to be current inter-organizational 
ties that have sustained over the years. The few inter-organizational ties existing imply that 
the overall decline is not as linear as the theory predicts in Germany. This might be due to the 
fact that the “dominant” ties in Germany have been unorganized, and thus the decline is more 
apparent in these ties; a change from weak organizational ties to weaker organizational ties is 
less striking than the a leap from very strong personnel ties to weak personnel ties - which is 
the case in Germany. The expectation of a decline finds support in the mapping done in this 
study. The question is if there exists any evidence supporting this trend in other unorganized 
ties.  
 
Compared with other unorganized ties in Germany, the findings from this mapping show a 
more apparent decline than previous literature about connections on the individual level. For 
instance, Jacobey and Behrens (2014) claim that a significant amount of union members have 
been representatives in Parliament, and when SPD have been in government there has been, 
for the most part, union presence. This implies unorganized personnel overlaps on a lower 
level – the membership level. During the end of the 1990s the DGB also campaigned for the 
SPD (Jacoby and Behrens 2014:6), which was a new practice from the union. The two 
authors also argue that ties on the elite level has been apparent and that several DGB high-
ranking officials were elected to the party’s executive board and nominated for minister posts 
during the 1990s and 2000s. For instance, in 2011 SPD elected high-ranking union official 
Armin Schild to the party’s executive board. And, in 2013 SPD elected Klaus Wiesehügel, 
president of the construction workers union (IG BAU), as Labour Minister in its shadow 
cabinet. “In doing so, the SPD is renewing an old tradition whereby this position is to be 
occupied by a representative of its major ally, the unions” (Jacoby and Behrens 2014:2). 
However, there is a lack of actual systematic mapping and knowledge about the strength of 
these personnel ties among ministers. The conclusion that these ties are strong is probably 
partly due to how the personnel ties are measured. This might be the reason for the overall 
conclusion that the personnel ties in Germany are the strongest of all ties; they are strong in 
terms of influence. Elaborated, the ties are perceived as very strong because there are 
influential people (ministers etc.) who are tying the party and union together. These people 
have common political interests, which they also are able to implement. Thus, the ties are 
seen as strong because the people that constitute these ties are important political actors. This 
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could also be the case in this thesis, as the 8 per cent who have a union association in the 
parliamentary group may be extremely influential and thus be part of a strong tie. However, 
to determine this is outside the scope of this thesis but could be interesting for future research 
using the same data.  
 
The mapping in this thesis shows that there is a gradual decline in personnel ties over time. 
The few inter-organizational ties that have been present continue to exist, for instance the 
Joint Committee, Gewerkschaftsrat. The preliminary findings from Allern and Bale suggest 
that the claim that unorganized ties are the strongest ties in Germany is debatable. Seemingly, 
there is not an evident decline in the inter-organizational ties, but more a stable development 
on a rather low level. This suggests that different kinds of party-union ties in Germany are 
present, but not strong. This also implies that the assumed difference in ties between Norway 
and Germany is not as evident as presumed.  
 
6.1.3 Coherent developments? 
 
The Norwegian case seems to have similar trends in all types of ties. Even the upsurge at the 
end of the 1990s is, to some extent, found in the development of both organized ties and other 
unorganized ties. Still, the dramatic detachment that is evident in the current period is not 
coherent with the suggested consolidation of close inter-organizational relations with the 
unions (Allern 2010:146). In Germany there is a stable decline in the personnel ties, but this 
decline is not as evident in more organized ties (Jacoby and Behrens 2014:2–3). However, 
these ties have never been very extensive and this might explain that the decline is not as 
apparent. Because the German organized ties have been moderate, the decline in personnel 
ties can have led the different types of ties to the same level; existent, but weak. To get one 
step further, with the knowledge already at hand, it is relevant to ask the question of whether 
the organized ties have stayed fairly strong or existent in the two countries to compensate for 
the decline in personnel ties. 
 
There is little evidence from the mapping that supports the notion about compensation in one 
or the other way. The current period shows a significant decline in both countries, and 
whether the decline is caused by development in other ties is difficult to determine. In 
Germany, it seems as if all ties continue to exist, but on a rather weak level. In the Norwegian 
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case it might be that the organized ties have realigned to compensate for the decline in 
personnel ties. As described in the historic review, prior to the 2001 election internal forces in 
Ap were opening up for cooperation with other interest groups and sought to weaken 
relations with LO. However, after the election, LO was yet again seen as a beneficial partner 
and realignment was evident in inter-organizational ties (Allern 2010). The realignment of 
other ties might have caused the personnel ties to be superficial, leading to a decline in the 
personnel ties, but not in the overall relationship. If this is the case, the ties seems to be 
mutually contingent, underlining that further and more detailed comparisons of different 
kinds of ties is essential to see the full party-union picture.  
 
6.2 Possible explanations 
 
This thesis is first and foremost a mapping of the actual ties and developments in each 
country. However, the comparative design also provides insight to the differences and 
similarities between the two countries. Moreover, it helps clarify possible implications of the 
findings and further provide clues to what might explain the development of party-union ties 
and the relation between the different ties.  
 
A common understanding among many scholars is that there are two main channels of 
influence in most democracies today: the numerical (electoral) channel and the corporate 
channel (Rokkan 1987). Both channels are essential democratic mechanisms, and both 
channels are intertwined to the party-union relationship. For instance, the party-union relation 
has been seen as a rational cost-benefit relationship where unions supply parties with votes, 
while the parties provides political influence and members (Allern 2010; Allern et al. 2007). 
Broadly, the social democratic parties and unions may be seen as guarantors for each other’s 
access to these channels, at least during the 1950s. The evident decline in the personnel ties 
may thus indicate that the parties and unions do not need each other anymore. In other words, 
the party-union relationships relevance in democratic processes - in power relations - has 
declined.  
 
The empirical analysis uncovered that the personnel ties have been and still are present in 
both Norway and Germany. The ties were strong and medium strong during the 1950s, and 
then started to decline during the 1970s. The pace of this decline, however, is different. The 
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German decline is more consistent, or gradual, than the decline in Norway. It appears as if the 
ties in Norway have been more contingent on historic events such as the 1997 election and 
internal party debates, than the ties in Germany. For instance, the SPD-DGB ties have 
declined gradually, despite events such as the reunification. The autonomy of the unions was 
especially evident during the 1970s, and this can possibly explain why the relationship 
appears somewhat unaffected by historic events. Or, rather it explains why the decline started 
during the 1970s. Compared to other types of ties in Germany, the personnel ties mapped are 
declining more severely. According to the recent article by Jacobey and Behrens (2014), 
organized ties in Germany are few but stable. Thus, the catch-all thesis might be more 
evident in the personnel ties than other ties in Germany. Moreover, the comparison in chapter 
6 also shows that the inter-organizational ties are not as scarce as many presume. Thus, 
Norway and Germany might not be as different as assumed: there are both organizational and 
unorganized ties present in both countries. 
 
The variation in the pace of the decline in Norway and Germany implies that a broad range of 
factors influences the development and strength of the personnel ties. One suggestion is that 
the effect of different factors might be determined by how the party and unions have been 
tied together from the beginning. This is for instance evident in Allern, Christiansen and 
Aylott’s (2007) study from Scandinavia referred to in chapter 2. The scholars find that the 
weaker the party-union ties were from the beginning, the more easily they unravel in 
response to environmental changes. They also find that the amount of resources each side can 
derive from the relationship influences the intensity of the tie (Allern, Aylott, and 
Christiansen 2007:629). Thus, historical and structural factors might be influential factors 
that should be explored. Moreover, it might be interesting to investigate further if the 
personnel ties in Germany were stronger than the Norwegian ties from the very beginning 
and if it might explain why the decline in Norway is more severe. Union density and class 
voting are also factors that might explain the development in the two countries. However, this 
will not be elaborated further in this thesis, but is meant to give a glimpse into a broader 
literature, including institutional perspectives, that can be used to uncover factors determining 
the party-union development. The comparisons and data provided in this study can contribute 
to future systematic comparisons where such factors and perspectives can be included. Thus, 
I will argue that this study is one step further in the direction of generating new hypotheses 
about the nature of the party-union relationship.  
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7 Concluding remarks 
 
In the introduction chapter I argued that to fully understand the existence, strength and 
development of the party-union ties, the individual level must be studied. The limited 
empirical data and knowledge about this level has been part of the rationale for conducting 
this study. The overarching aim has been to contribute with new empirical knowledge to the 
discussion about the uniformity of the party-union decline, by mapping personnel ties. Thus, 
this thesis has provided and systematized data about the personnel ties connecting the social 
democratic parties and unions together in Germany and Norway. Moreover, I have mapped 
the frequency of the parliamentary representatives that hold or have held an official trade 
union position during four parliamentary periods, starting in 1957 and ending with the current 
period (2013-2017). Further, I have analyzed and compared the data over time and between 
countries. Based on the party model literature and secondary empirical literature about the 
ties, I defined some expectations that guided the empirical analyses. Lastly, I compared the 
findings with other kinds of ties and discussed how the findings are part of the overall trends 
in the party-union relationship. In the next section I will answer the research questions in 
light of the findings from the mapping and review the expectations and results. 
 
7.1 Main findings 
 
The overarching research question in this thesis is: To what extent are there personnel ties 
between the trade unions and social democratic parties in Norway and Germany, and how 
have these ties developed over time? The study has shown that there have been and still are 
personnel ties between the trade unions and social democratic parties in Norway and 
Germany. These ties were most evident during the 1950s, when they were strong in Germany 
and medium strong in Norway. Thus, the first expectation (E1) from chapter 3, that the ties 
would be strong during the first period, finds support.  
 
During the 1970s the ties were medium strong in both countries while at the end of the 1990s 
the Norwegian ties became strong while the German ties declined within the medium strong 
category. The extent of the ties today is rather limited in both countries, and the current ties 
can be described as weak. Moreover, the ties are almost non-existent in Norway. Thus, the 
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second research question and the second expectation (E2) about a decline, finds support in 
this study; there has been a decline in both countries since 1957. The pace of this decline has 
been different in the two countries. The ties in Germany has had a gradual decline (strong-
medium-weak), while the ties in Norway started off as medium strong during the first two 
parliamentary periods, following an upsurge to strong ties in 1997, before the drastic decrease 
in 2013. Thus, the research question about the developments compared is that the personnel 
ties have developed partly different in the two countries; an overall decline is evident, but the 
pace is different. The third expectation (E3) is thus also confirmed because the overall 
development shows that the German ties are consistently stronger than the Norwegian ties 
(except in the third period). 
 
It is evident that the personnel ties are declining in accordance with other ties. The 
Norwegian case has similar trends in all types of ties. Even the upsurge at the end of the 
1990s is, to some extent, found in the development of both organized ties and other 
unorganized ties. Still, the recent developments in the personnel ties differ. While the inter-
organized ties have been consolidated, the personnel ties have almost vanished. In Germany 
there is a stable decline in the personnel ties, but this decline is perhaps not as evident in 
more organized ties. However, these ties have never been extensive and this might explain 
that the decline is not as apparent. Thus, the answer to the last research question about the 
coherence of different kinds of ties is that there is some coherence, but that this should be 
researched further - extending the scope to the whole party-organization and including all 
parliamentary periods.  
 
7.1.1 Trade union background as a selection criteria 
 
In chapter 2, I presented a short overview of the recruitment literature. The rationale was that 
these procedures and the recruitment patterns influence the composition of the parliamentary 
groups. The mapping in this thesis shows that the number of parliamentary representatives 
who have had an official trade union position when entering parliament is decreasing. Almost 
none have an official position while in parliament (overlaps). As indicated previously, this 
might be explained by the professionalization of politics and the complications with wearing 
two hats at the same time. In addition, a parliamentary seat is a fulltime position, seldom 
compatible with other official positions. Another aspect is that parliamentary representatives 
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increasingly are coming from the party ranks and are political “broilers” (Allern, Karlsen, and 
Narud 2014; Best and Cotta 2000; Narud and Valen 2008). It might also be explained by the 
increase of other selection criteria such as geographical concerns and education or gender - 
the competition has advanced and the criteria list has been extended (Allern, Karlsen, and 
Narud 2014). Does the mapping indicate that trade union background is not an important 
selection criterion anymore? 
 
Compared, the share of the parliamentary group that has an official union position 
background is consistently a bit higher in Germany than in Norway (except in the third 
period). Also, the majority of the unionists in the Norwegian parliamentary group are 
associated with the national level, while in Germany the majority are associated to the lower 
union levels. This partly supports the logical assumption that the differences in system and 
size might cause level differences between the two countries. For instance, the findings in 
this thesis show that during the current period there are only three representatives connected 
to the national union level in Germany, compared to 12 who are connected to a lower union 
level. In Norway the two parliamentary representatives with a union background are both 
connected to the national level. The associations might be described as more elitist in Norway 
than in Germany, at least regarding level. In terms of numbers, SPD seems to have broader 
network of union representatives in parliament than Ap. Still, Ap has representatives closer to 
the central organization. Can these clusters of people with a union background be called elite 
networks? 
 
It is not necessarily given that a person who is a union official is the spokesperson of the 
union in every political setting. Still, people who go from union to party, or who have one 
foot in each camp, bring some kind of “union-baggage”. If many parliamentary 
representatives have the same background it is undeniably a channel, or a kind of network. 
The question is if this is a noteworthy or influential network. The mapping in Norway shows 
that there is a difference between the group elected directly to parliament (the candidates on 
top of the lists) and the group including the alternates. The frequency of candidates with 
union background increases when the alternate representatives are singled out. This suggests 
that a substantial share of the party’s top list candidates hold or have held official positions in 
a trade union. In terms of closeness to power and decisions, a reasonable assumption is that 
the higher up on the lists, the more influential or “important” the candidates are. Thus, the top 
list candidates with a union background are most likely influential in both organizations 
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(union and party), and might be part of some sort of party-union elite network. For instance, 
the mapping and comparison over time show that the ties studied have declined over the 
years. Still, during the third period, the ties in Norway were strong and most likely influential 
- considering the events and realignment of inter-organizational ties at the beginning of the 
2000s (Allern 2010). In Germany these networks are broader in terms of more people. Yet, 
how elitist or high rank these representatives are, is difficult to determine. The fact that there 
is little empirical data on the personnel ties, and that these ties have been described as the 
strongest ties of all ties in Germany, might indicate that the ties in Germany have been 
perceived as strong because the representatives are influential. Thus, it is also a question of 
how the ties are measured and assessed.  
 
7.2 Contribution and generalization potential  
 
In the introduction of this study I contended that the relationship between parties and interest 
groups shapes the nature of democratic governance (Thomas 2001), and that research on 
these relationships is essential to better understand power relations in democratic countries. 
The question is how this study has contributed in this respect. As highlighted in the above 
section, this thesis has provided new data that can be used for further studies and 
comparisons. It might also lead to better insight about how the personnel ties open up for 
contact between the social democratic parties and trade unions. Since it is the parliamentary 
groups that have been studied the findings may also shed light on who is recruited to 
parliament and what union partiality they bring to the table. Moreover, it is possible to get 
better insight to additional and unofficial channels of influence in democratic countries.  
 
When conducting this study the aim was to shed light on the common understanding of a 
general decline in the party-union relationship by comparing the two cases. Since most case 
studies have limited generalisation potential the hope is that this mapping can contribute with 
important data that might lead to studies where broader generalisation is possible. Since both 
cases confirm the assumption of a decline this increases the generalisation potential and 
imply that such decline might be evident in other Northern European countries with 
traditionally strong party-union ties. Still, the variation in the developments also implies that 
further research is necessary.  
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If there are networks of politicians coming from unions, who interchange the same official 
positions, these are undeniably party-union networks with access to political decisions. The 
fact that these networks and their influence are more or less unknown to the general public, 
underlines why it is important to study and map personnel ties. Does the decline in personnel 
ties found in this thesis indicate that the trade unions – representing thousands of workers – 
have lost its influence or place in the democratic processes? Or, does it imply that the 
democratic processes have changed and become so democratic that personnel party-union ties 
are not perceived as acceptable anymore? The union-bias these representatives bring to the 
table might be seen as too biased and thus be constrained. Or, personnel ties might be 
stronger in other, less public parts of the party organization that do not have to answer to the 
public and press at all times. Perhaps the party and union strategy is to continue with strong 
ties, but the recruitment process to parliament does not facilitate representatives with a union 
background. These are all questions that should be examined in future studies.  
 
7.3 Challenges and future research 
 
In this thesis the main challenge has been to find and gather data. It has been time consuming 
and especially challenging to collect, translate and code the German data. Since the data from 
the two countries have been collected slightly different there are some issues related to 
reliability and equivalence. For instance, the consistency in the data from Germany is 
unknown and thus it is a chance for some underreporting in the final data set. However, the 
data that actually exists has provided enough information to create a data set comprising 
parliamentary representatives’ trade union background - which is what I aimed to study. 
Thus, despite the difficulties throughout the process I have managed to contribute with 
completely new data. The fact that there is no data on personnel ties, which is claimed to be 
the strongest ties in Germany, is puzzling, but underlines the relevance of this thesis and 
mapping. The comparison with the Norwegian data, which is a bit more advanced, have been 
useful both in terms of comparison of trends, but also to uncover how the German data can be 
improved and serve future research about the party-union ties. This leads to the last section in 
this thesis, is it possible to generate any new hypotheses from this study? What should future 
research focus on? 
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The aim of this thesis is to shed new light on the relationship between social democratic 
parties and trade unions. I have questioned the uniformity of the party-union decline and 
found that there is an evident decline in the personnel ties in Norway and Germany. 
However, the trends differ in the two countries. In Germany there is a gradual decline, while 
the trend is not as linear in Norway. Thus, future research should focus on improving the data 
sets and differentiate between levels and positions of the representatives. Newer studies 
should also include the whole party organization and add years or parliamentary terms. This 
will hopefully strengthen the results and give better insight to the variation that is evident in 
Norway. The main hypothesis that can be generated from this study is that there is a decline 
in personnel party-union ties as well. This study is thus a refinement of the already existing 
hypotheses derived from the catch-all thesis and cartel-thesis. Moreover, the fact that this 
decline is evident in both Norway and Germany calls for further studies of personnel ties in 
other European countries. I will also argue that this study generates several questions about 
the representatives and about possible elite networks that frequent the parliamentary 
buildings. Who are these representatives and is the trade union background influential? Is 
there really a decline in terms of power and influence? What determines the strength of the 
relationship? Is it the representative’s power or the total share of representatives that 
constitute a strong tie? Moreover, what factors can explain the variance in the trends? These 
are essential questions that underline the importance of party-union ties in democratic 
processes, but also the importance of this study and future research.  
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Appendix 
Data sets available by request: anne.hoyer@outlook.com 
Code manual  
 
 The data is collected from two different sources in Germany and NSD in Norway.  
 To extract the representatives with high positions I have used word search both in 
word and manually. The program reading the scanned documents could not interpret 
all the text, about 50 per cent of the scanned documents have been read and searched 
manually. I used the same search words and read through the documents to highlight 
the search words. The search words are as follows:  
- Gewerkschaft, Deutsche gewerkschaftsbund, DGB, Industriegewerkschaft, IG. 
- The main search word is gewerkschaft, with few exceptions the word cover all 
kinds of unions, thus it saves time because a lot of the unions have changed name 
and been merged during the last 50 years. Ex: ÖTV, ver.di etc.  
 Hits, associated organisations included: GEW/IG: Die Gewerkschaft Erziehung und 
Wissenschaft (GEW)/ The German Education Union (GEW), BAU: 
Industriegewerkschaft Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt/industrial affiliate of the DGB BCE:The 
IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie (IG BCE)/industrial affiliate of the DGB, BE: IG 
Bergbau un Energie/ later IG BCE, ÖTV: Gewerkschaft öffentliche Dienste, 
Transport und Verkehr (ÖTV). Now ver.di: ver.diVereinte 
Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft "United Services Union. Union was formed when the 
German Salaried Employees' Union (DAG) merged with four unions of the German 
Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) (DPG, HBV, ÖTV, IG Medien, IG Metall: 
Industrial Union of Metalworkers, part of DGB, IG Medien: IG Medien, druck und 
papier, now part of ver.di 
 Norwegian search: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LO, fagforening, forbund, 24 unions 
under LO. Many of the unions have merged and thus the old names of the unions is 
included in the data set. After some research on the unions web pages I have included 
the names of the unions before they merged. This is however only the unions that had 
no word hit on the main union name.  
 List of LO- organisations with word hits, code in NSD data set included: 
- 6117 Landsorganisasjonen i Norge 
- 6588 Tele- og Dataforbundet 
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- 6044 Norsk Elektriker- og Kraftstasjonsforbund 
- 6465 Fellesforbundet 
- 6375 Norsk Barnevernpedagogforbund 
- 6306 Norsk Vernepleierforbund 
- 6253 Norsk Sosionomforbund 
- 6006 Norsk Forbund for Arbeidsledere og Tekniske Funksjonærer 
- 6075 Handel og Kontor (HK) 
- 6396 Norsk Olje- og Petrokjemisk Fagforbund 
- 6103 Norsk Kjemisk Industriarbeiderforbund 
- 6227 Norsk Treindustriarbeiderforbund 
- 6139 Norsk Musikerforbund 
- 6506 Norges Offisersforbund (NOF) 
- 6008 Norsk Arbeidsmandsforbund (NAF) 
- 6123 Norsk Lokomotivmannsforbund (N.L.F.) 
- 6158 Norsk Postforbund 
- 6159 Den Norske Postorganisasjon 
- 6178 Norsk Sjømannsforbund (NSF) 
- 6220 Norsk Tjenestemannslag (NTL) 
- 6226 Norsk Transportarbeiderforbund (NTF) 
- 6141 Norsk Nærings- og Nytelsesmiddelarbeiderforbund (NNN) 
- 6237 Skolenes landsforbund (SL) 
 The representatives have been given ascending ID numbers and all numbers are 
unique. 
 Transfers –direct transfers are difficult to establish because there is restricted 
information about year start-end.  
 Based on the web search all hits are extracted, documented and coded, including 
members  (none-high positions).  
 
Coding Norway and Germany:  
 The criteria applied in both data sets: official positions meaning a position where the 
representative has a central role and tasks that go beyond mere membership or 
volunteer activity. The approach and definition is somewhat flexible and exploratory 
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and official positions ranges from president, board members, executive, managers, 
honorary member and Chair or Head of different committees and boards. 
 The hits have been coded: None: 0, Member: 1, High position:  2, unclear 9.  
 I have also coded position, transfer 1 and 2, overlap as three variables. The coding of 
all variables are as follows:  
- Transfer is the main variable in the data and includes all people that hold or have 
held an official position in the trade union, regardless of time and year. It is coded 
as 1 transfer, 2 no transfer, 9 uncertain. 
- Overlaps and position as main occupation are coded similar: 0 No position as 
main occupation/No overlap, 1 have worked fulltime in union/ overlap, 9 
uncertain. Overlaps are understood in a narrow sense compared to transfer; only 
the rep. that have documented that they have actually had an official position in 
DGB or LO simultaneously as they were in parliament (year, from to end). The 
rest are coded 9 unclear.  
- Transfer 2: Direct transfer, subsequent years. Only Norwegian data. Coded similar 
as transfer 1.  
 Coding of level: local, district and regional is lower level category 1, National level is 
3, international level is 4, uncertain is 9 – members and none hits is part of this 
category. Most rep. have been representatives locally, but if they have had a national 
position they are coded as 3. Youth groups are not included as a value, because it is 
part of the organisation as a whole and thus coded regularly. If it is not apparent that it 
is national or lower level it is coded as 9 -uncertain. If there are several positions 
documented but only one is connected to a region or national level, it is coded in 
accordance with the level that is specified.   
 When year is not specified it is coded as 0 
 There is also an uncertain category (9), where all members and none hits are included. 
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Results:  
 
Germany: 
 
 Transfer Overlaps N National 
level 
Lower 
Level 
Missing 
+ int. 
level 
N 
Period 1 27% 50 5.4% 10 187 24% 12 56% 28 9+1 50 
Period 2 18% 39 1.9% 4 215 28% 11 64% 25 3 39 
Period 3 12% 31 0.8% 2 261 26% 8 65% 20 2+1 31 
Period 4 8% 16 0 0 198 19% 3 75% 12 1 16 
 
 
Norway: 
 
Including alternate representatives: 
 
 Transfer Overlaps N National 
level 
 
Lower 
Level 
Missing + 
int. level 
N 
Period 1 16% 20 6.3% 8 127 75% 15 25% 5 0 20 
Period 2 13% 17 2.2% 3 134 53% 9 47% 8 0 17 
Period 3 20% 24 1.5% 1 118 58% 14 42% 10 0 24 
Period 4 1.2% 2 0 0 167 100% 2 0 0 0 2 
 
 
Excluding alternates representatives 
 Transfer Overlaps N 
Period 1 21% 16 6.4% 5 78 
Period 2 16% 12 1.3% 1 76 
Period 3 31% 20 1.5% 1 65 
Period 4 4% 2 0 0 55 
 
